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THE SWEDISH JUSTITIEOMBUDSMAN*
WALTER GELLHORNt
How IT ALL BEGAN
MucIH of the Swedish Constitution of 1809 has been forgotten; its
delineation of royal powers and parliamentary structure has little
relevance to today's realities. But the office it created, that of the Jus-
titieombudsman, has lived and grown. It has inspired similar establish-
ments in Finland, Denmark, Norway, and New Zealand, and has added
the word "Ombudsman" to the international vocabulary.'
When in 1713, Swedish King Charles XII appointed a representative,
an Ombudsman, to keep an eye on the royal officials of that day, he
simply responded to the passing moment's need. He was bogged down in
seemingly endless campaigns at the head of his army and in diplomatic
negotiations that followed them. And so, very possibly ignorant that an
overly-occupied Russian monarch had previously done the very same
thing, he sensibly commissioned a trusted subordinate to scrutinize the
conduct of the tax gatherers, the judges, and the few other law adminis-
trators who acted in his name at home.
What had begun as a temporary expedient became a permanent
element of administration, under the title of Chancellor of Justice. A
century passed. The fortunes of the monarchy ebbed and then again
grew large, but at last royal government was bridled and Sweden took
hesitant steps toward representative democracy. Nothing would do
then but that the parliament should have its own overseer of adminis-
* Copyright 1965 by Walter Gelihorn. The substance of this article will appear in a
volume to be published by the Harvard University Press in 1966.
j- Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University.
1. Historians, intent upon demonstrating that there is nothing new under the sun,
have sometimes discerned resemblances between the Ombudsman and the Roman tribune
of the people, the "censors" in seventeenth century American Colonies, or even the
Control Yuan that functioned in China during the Han Dynasty, 206 B.C.-A.D. 220. See,
e.g., W. HALLER, DER SwEnDiscu JusrriEobmus.1A 16-27 (1964). But the nineteenth cen-
tury Swedes who created their ombudsman were probably not antiquarians, nor have the
later creators of ombudsmen looked farther than Sweden for inspiration.
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trative behavior. The king had his man; let parliament have its man
too, as a safeguard against royal officers' disregard of law. In 1809 a
constitution, hastily composed during a period of domestic and inter-
national strife, defined new relationships between monarch and sub-
jects. Among other things, it provided for a watchman over the law's
watchmen who, unlike the already existing king's inspector, would
report his discoveries to parliament.
Yet, despite the antiquity of the office and the present enthusiasm for
the ideas that underlie it, the scope of the Swedish Ombudsman's
power and his means of employing it are inadequately understood
abroad. Foreign discussions have sometimes so romanticized this highly
worthy Swedish governmental institution that a fresh look at actuality
may now be useful.
SWEDEN'S GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM
In order to understand the role of Sweden's Ombudsman, one must
first understand the Swedish governmental structure as a whole. It little
resembles that of other twentieth century constitutional monarchies
with which western jurists are familiar. A country about the size of
California with less than half of California's population governs itself
admirably by means deemed outmoded elsewhere.
The Swedish king no longer exercises political power, though, in
form, all important governmental decisions are his. The decisions he
purports to make are in fact those of the seventeen Councillors of
State who are generally characterized as cabinet ministers (in truth only
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister officially bear a ministerial
title). Ministers, chosen by the Prime Minister alone, need not be
members of the Parliament, though all are entitled to address it. Most
importantly for purposes of the present discussion, ministers do not
head large administrative departments for whose functioning they
bear ultimate responsibility. Ministries are small bodies, rarely with
as many as a hundred employees including the lowliest clerical and
custodial personnel. Their function is not so much to administer as to
plan. They prepare Government bills and budgetary proposals, they
promulgate regulations when specifically empowered by Parliament,
they issue directives that may guide but do not necessarily command
administrators, 2 they allocate funds and make appointments, and they
entertain appeals that, in some classes of administrative matters
2. See N. Herlitz, Swedish Administrative Law: Some Characteristic Features, 3 SCAND.
STUD. IN LAW 89, 93-94, 100 (1959). And compare F. ScuMwr and S. STR8MIIOLM, LEGAL
VALUES IN MODERN SWEDEN 26-30 (1964).
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described below, may be addressed to the King. Action on these appeals
is taken nominally by the King in Council, but the collective decision
is almost invariably a routine confirmation of a minister's judgment, for
the weekly session of the King in Council disposes of literally hundreds
of matters within perhaps half an hour. Important issues are of course
dealt with by more leisurely intra-Cabinet discussions, as well as by
searching consultations between ministerial officials and others whose
expert opinions or interested views may be relevant. The significant
point to note here is, simply, that except for the Foreign Office, minis-
tries are not themselves administrative bodies, nor in any immediate
sense responsible for administration by others, though they assuredly
influence administration by deciding appeals. The Cabinet or an in-
dividual minister may occasionally be under political fire for acts of
administrative bodies structurally subordinate to him because their
budgets pass through his ministry and appeals from them to the King
are considered by him; but when this occurs, a minister may hunt with
the hounds, joining in verbally castigating the administrators or promis-
ing to investigate them.
As for Parliament, its two chambers must approve and may amend
proposals submitted by the Government-that is, by the Cabinet. Its
382 members-among whom are many local officials, a number of
teachers, a few civil servants, and a handful of lawyers-may themselves
initiate proposals only during the first fifteen days of each annual ses-
sion. Parliament does not investigate individual administrators or the
conduct of public administration in general; the Constitution, indeed,
actually forbids parliamentary consideration of specific administrative
acts, though discussion of general principles is permissible.3 As a result
of such a discussion, Parliament does at times request a ministry (or a
ministry can decide on its own initiative) to create a "commission" to
consider problems that may call for new legislation. Members of
Parliament may serve on a commission of inquiry, along with special-
ists drawn from any source, the secretariat being provided by the
suitable ministry. Commissions, let it be stressed, are not primarily
investigators or critics of the past. They are students of what should be
done in the future by general legislation. A commission report, when
3. Article 90 of the Swedish Constitution provides in part that "matters relating to the
appointment and removal of officials, the decisions, resolutions, and judgments of the
executive or judicial authorities ... shall in no case or manner be subject to considera.
tion or investigation by the Riksdag, its chambers or committees, except as literally
prescribed in the fundamental laws."
Compare S. Jdgerski6ld, The Swedish Constitution: A Survey, 58 J. IDrit . L INsr.
1, 5, 17 (1963).
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presented (probably after several years of deliberation), is circulated
by the ministry for comment by all concerned. The report and the re-
actions to it may shape a later Government bill. The work of a
Swedish commission rarely resembles American congressional investi-
gations which, while nominally in aid of legislative understanding, are
more often than not thinly veiled assaults upon administration of laws
already in force.
If, then, Swedish public administration is subject to scant ministerial
or parliamentary control, where does supervisory power lie? For a
foreigner unattuned to the unwritten subtleties of Swedish govern-
ment, that question is extremely difficult to answer. One is tempted to
say outright that supervisory power is non-existent, each official being
answerable only to The Law and his own conscience rather than to
some higher official. No doubt that answer would ignore the realities
of human relationships, for most persons find life easier when they
follow orders than when they assert independence. Nevertheless, to
a degree far beyond the generally accepted concepts of modern ad-
ministration, a Swedish official is bound to apply statutory law as he
alone believes it demands. If his belief differs from others', his is the
one that counts. In some fields, however, Parliament empowers the
King (that is, the King's ministers) to prescribe how statutes should be
interpreted; thus uniformity may be nurtured.
In structure much of the responsibility for carrying out the com-
mands of statutes and the Cabinet policies that sometimes elaborate
them has been laid on "central administrative boards," each dealing
with an indicated field-as, for example, social welfare, prisons, health,
housing, social insurance, forestry, fisheries and agriculture. Each board
has at its head a Director General, appointed by the Cabinet for a
term of years or for life; the board members are full-time senior
officials, sometimes with the addition of part-time representatives of
special interest groups. When boards have overlapping concerns (as
might occur, for instance, in connection with forestry and agriculture),
they are expected to cooperate; no ministry can make them do so.
The boards do not, however, have direct access to Parliament. Their
budgetary demands come under ministerial scrutiny, as do their recom-
mendations of new substantive legislation. So a strong measure of
political control remains, for the boards are not free to make their own
grand designs. Moreover, as has already been suggested, individual
decisions of central boards may as a rule be appealed to the King in
Council, so that a ministry may occasionally upset a board's judgment
in a particular case. Reversal of a board's action in one case does not,
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however, bind its behavior in the next, for the board remains duty-
bound to obey The Law (as it conceives The Law to be) instead of
obeying the Minister. One may suppose, realistically, that no official
enjoys being reversed on appeal, so that reversals do no doubt shape
future decisions in fact. Moreover, a rebellious or opinionated official
is unlikely to be promoted rapidly, so here again the realities of life
make for considerable uniformity of decision despite the officers'
seeming freedom from ministerial control. In short, a Minister may
possess a substantial measure of informal authority beyond what ap-
pears on the pages of law books.
Theoretically, a central board's independence is shared by the board's
subordinates. An underling who thinks The Law is on his side may
disregard a contrary view in superior quarters. If he does so, his
superior may detest him, but may not discipline him severely.4 The
serious punishment of all but the most minor civil servants--and es-
pecially the ultimate punishment, removal from office-is left largely
in the hands of courts of law. An official may thus be penalized for
wrongdoing, but, for practical purposes, only by a judicial decree after
a formal trial and not by the methods of personnel administration
ordinarily utilized by sizeable organizations.
What has been said about civil administration is true, equally, of
judicial administration in all its ramifications. Judges are not hier-
archically organized so that the decisions of a higher tribunal control
the work of the lesser courts. Each judge applies the law as he sees it.
He may of course be influenced by the reasoning of other jurists whom
he respects. He nevertheless remains free to determine whom he does
respect, and how strongly. He and he alone is responsible for the cor-
rectness of his judgments.
Similarly, each public prosecutor must do his duty according to The
4. A 1964 case involving the central administration of the Swedish prison system sug-
gests how difficult it is to centralize administrative responsibility. The governor of a
prison ordered an assistant to assume certain duties. The assistant refused. The governor
then asked the Legal Division of the prisons administration whether he could discipline
the assistant in some way. The Legal Division instructed him not to do this because,
among other things, the disobeyed order had not been in writing. The prison governor
then complained to the Ombudsman that the central administration was not doing
its duty. The Ombudsman proceeded to investigate this complaint by a subordinate
official that his superiors would not support him against one of his own subordinates.
5. See S. Jdgerskild, Swedish State Officials and Their Position under Public Law
and Labor Law, 4 SCAND. STUD. IN LAw 103 (1960). A superior's imposition of an adminis-
trative disciplinary measure (such as transfer to a new assignment) is subject to de
novo review by the Supreme Administrative Court. In 1963 the Court received 28 cases
of that kind for review. Sweden has some 180,000 civil servants and officials, and addi-
tional thousands of public employees of other grades.
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Law. True, a Supreme Prosecutor sits in Stockholm, attempting to
harmonize the actions taken by prosecutors thoughout the nation. But
he is more counsellor than commander. The Law gives the orders.
How, one may well ask, can this individualistic system of public ad-
ministration, perhaps well suited to a day when communities were
scattered, communications were slow, and problems were few, meet
the needs of a highly organized society? In part it does so simply be-
cause the individuals within the system are well educated, conscientious,
and uplifted by professional morale; Sweden has long had a thoroughly
justified pride in its able and honorable public servants.0 Furthermore,
for all the folklore about "the stubborn Swede," willful adherence to
opinion is not commonplace among officials; they seek consensus
rather than dissent and are therefore receptive to other officials' views
even when not, in theory, forced to accept them. Thirdly, to a degree
far beyond the usual, Swedish officials function in the proverbial gold-
fish bowl. Their files are, with stated exceptions, open to the press and
the public at large, so that reckless or too highly personalized patterns
of action can perhaps be discerned and criticized more readily than in
other countries; even papers bearing upon matters still under con-
sideration are available to inquirers.7 Fourthly, since each official must
apply The Law as he understands it, care is taken to draft statutes that
cannot admit of many diverse readings, and the "legislative history"
of each bill is carefully compiled so that doubts will not later arise
about the intended purposes of a new law; explicit statutory detail
reduces the area of administrative choice and thus the risk of adminis-
trative aberration, but, perhaps offsetting this virtue, it increases the
administrative rigidity sometimes denounced as "bureaucratic inflexi-
bility." Fifthly, statutes sometimes explicitly authorize the issuance of
regulations or general instructions that will diminish the range of in-
dividual officials' choice. Finally, individual administrators' judgments
6. As has occurred in many other countries, however, Sweden now faces a real risk that
talents needed in its public service will be drained off by other respectable and more
remunerative callings. In times past officials were compensated highly not only in
esteem but also in salary. The respect given them remains high, but not their income.
Since 1900 the real income of workers in industry has increased about 250 per cent; that
of agricultural workers nearly 400 per cent. The median real income of salaried em.
ployees has risen proportionately. During that same period the real income level of civil
servants has remained stationary, so that, relatively to others, the financial position of
public officers has been declining. The possible impact of this decline upon the prestige
of the civil service cannot be wholly ignored.
7. For effective discussion of the scope of the publicity principle and its application,
see N. Herlitz, Publicity of Official Documents in Sweden, 1958 PBLIC LAW 50; H. MIix,
A Pattern of Effective Protection: The Ombudsman, 11 How. L.J. 386, 887-89 (1965).
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are, in varying degrees, subject to review by others, first within their
own official establishment (such as a central administrative board) and
then by appeal to the King, that is, to the cognizant minister.
When the volume of appeals became too great for effective con-
sideration, Sweden in 1909 created a Supreme Administrative Court to
which certain classes of cases (preponderantly those involving taxation)
now go instead of to the King in Council.8 The Supreme Administra-
tive Court has all the powers, in respect of the cases it is given to decide,
that were formerly exercised by the King in Council; it can concern
itself with issues of discretion as well as legality and can enter the
finally dispositive orders it deems correct.9 A separate Supreme Court
for Social Insurance has similarly taken over the final power to con-
sider appeals from administrative judgments in its field. While a deci-
sion by one of these high administrative organs disposes only of the
immediate case, the tribunals are so greatly respected that, without
formally recognizing the doctrine of stare decisis, administrators do
in fact pay great attention to their well-indexed volumes of judgments
rendered.
8. B. Lagergren, Le Conseil d'Etat de Suide, 15 INT. REv. AD. N. Sc. 22 (1949). And
see also N. Herlitz, Swedish Administrative Law, 3 SCAND. STUDIES IN LAW 89, 95.99, 104-
07 (1959).
9. The Supreme Administrative Court has sixteen members who sit in three divisions,
handling more than four thousand cases annually. The nature of its work is revealed by
the following statistics culled from recent annual reports:
Cases decided
Activity Primarily concerned - 1962 1963
Agriculture 35 40
Communications 1,790 1,516





Public Employment 34 20
Social Welfare 284 300
Trade 21 69
Totals 4,350 4273
The backlog of undecided cases rose from 6,571 in 1961 to 7,127 in 1963. Of the un-
decided cases as of the end of 1963, 5,796 involved tax matters, which provide the bulk
of the business now flowing into the court.
An Administrative Court of Appeals initially considers appeals in certain clanes of
cases having to do with public finances, including tax controversies which are further
appealable to the Supreme Administrative Court.
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As for the ordinary courts of law, they have power to apply the penal
law to administrators-and nothing more. They cannot command an
official to do an act, nor restrain its being done. They cannot issue
declaratory orders that constitute authoritative interpretations of ap-
plicable law. They have no role to play, in short, in securing sound
administration or in forestalling bad administration. They can only
punish an administrator for having violated the law.
That power, however, is broader than it seems, for in Sweden an
official commits the crime of "breach of duty" if through "negligence,
imprudence, or unskilfulness" he fails to act in the manner required
by a statute, a valid regulation or direction, or "the nature of his
office;"' 1 and the court, when it finds the "crime" of negligence or in-
competence to have been committed, may punish it by fining, imprison-
ing, suspending, or dismissing the sinning civil servant."'
The judges themselves, it may now be remarked, are also civil ser-
vants, subject like the rest to being prosecuted for carelessness and
ignorance without more. Lower level civil servants may be prosecuted
in courts of first instance. The judges of those courts, along with
superior civil servants and the heads of most Central Administrative
Boards, are triable before a Court of Appeals. Appeals Court judges
and the heads of a few Central Administrative Boards are triable before
the Supreme Court. Ministers and members of the Supreme Court or
the Supreme Administrative Court are triable only before a Special
Court of Impeachment, which fortunately has had no occasion to con-
vene for well over a century.12
In a technical sense the Ombudsman fits into this system of individ-
ual instead of institutional responsibility simply as a prosecutor who
can proceed against official wrongdoers (or non-doers) before the tri-
bunals authorized to mete out punishment. The technicalities of the
Ombudsman's power do not, however, describe its actualities.
10. SWEDISH PENAL CODE, ch. 20, § 4.
11. A civil servant may also be required to pay damages to a private person he has
injured; but a suit for damages cannot be privately initiated against a higher civil servant
or against a judge. Only if the competent public prosecutor supports the claim against
such an official can the possibility of assessing damages be considered. Compare S. D.
Anderman, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 225, 228 (1962): "The
statutory coverage is so broad that were citizens left free with this weapon, the resulting
harassment of public officials would unduly limit their effectiveness in office."
A private civil action for damages can, however, be maintained against a lower civil
servant even if the public prosecutor has declined to prosecute, having found no breach
of duty. Civil suits of that nature are said to be extremely rare; for practical purposes
one may conclude that the possibility of private redress hinges on the public prosecutor's
appraisal of the action or non-action which allegedly caused the injury.




THE SELECnON OF THE OMBUDSMAN
The Swedish Constitution declares simply that the Ombudsman
should be a person of "known legal ability and outstanding integrity." 13
He is chosen by forty-eight electors, twenty-four from each chamber
of the Parliament, themselves reflecting the proportional strength of
the political parties in that chamber. The electors have only fifteen
days in which to agree upon their choice. Because this leaves little
time for exploration and discussion, at least preliminary canvassing of
possibilities has sometimes been undertaken by the party leaders. As
a matter of tradition, however, partisan considerations rarely weigh
heavily. From the earliest days of the office the Ombudsmen have usu-
ally been drawn from the judiciary. Neither the press nor the citizenry
seems to have taken much interest in past elections or speculated about
possible future candidates. Those finally chosen have had solid profes-
sional capabilities that were unlikely to have been noticed by the public
at large; as one parliamentary leader put it, "The man we select does
not lend distinction to the office; the office distinguishes him." The
Ombudsman now in office, Alfred Bexelius, had been a member of
the career judiciary for thirty-four years and had served as Deputy
Ombudsman before being elected to his present post.14
The Ombudsman's term of office is four years. His salary equals that
of a Supreme Court Judge. Parliament may remove an Ombudsman
during his term, though it has never done so. Reelection is possible,
though service beyond three terms (that is, twelve years) is highly un-
likely. An Ombudsman who is not reelected when his term expires
may resume his previous career or may choose to be pensioned.
So far as can humanly be achieved, the Swedish system immunizes
an Ombudsman against the political pressures of the day. He has ab-
solutely no responsibility to the Government (the Cabinet) or to any
of its elements. He reports annually to Parliament. His parliamentary
relationships are with the First Law Committee, which happens to be
under the chairmanship of an Opposition member. 5 Such complaints
13. Art. 96, in an official English translation by SARAH V. ToRPu.T, Tm Co.;sntmo.N
oF Sw DEN (1954).
14. The Deputy Ombudsman is chosen in the same manner as is the Ombudsman
himself. He is answerable directly to Parliament rather than to the Ombudsman. In the
original conception of the office the Deputy was to serve only during the Ombudsman's
incapacity or absence, but in fact his work is now performed on a full-time basis. See
U. Lundvik, Comments on the Ombudsmen for Civil Affairs, in D. C. RowAT, TiU OaMDsns-
mAN 44, 48 (1965).
15. In budgetary matters, such as provision for additions to his staff, the Ombudsman
also has contact with the Bank Committee. And when consideration is given to changing
the scope of the Ombudsman's responsibilities, the Constitutional Committee is involved.
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as may be addressed to Parliament concerning the Ombudsman's work
are channeled to that committee. It may question the Ombudsman,
but in recent times has apparently had no occasion to carry on any
further discussion. The annual report is reviewed by the committee-
or, perhaps more accurately, by the committee's secretary, usually a
youthful judge on temporary assignment. Members may criticize the
Ombudsman's past decisions or the general direction of his work, and
these criticisms may possibly influence future activities; but the Om-
budsman and members of the committee join in asserting unequivocally
that at no time, directly or indirectly, has a parliamentarian sought to
influence work in progress.
The leader of an Opposition party has privately commented that the
Government needs no special mechanisms for controlling an Ombuds-
man because, he says, the persons who are chosen to be Ombudsmen
"can be counted on not to rock the boat. They all have pretty much
the same outlook as the Ministers, they understand one another with-
out having to send blueprints, and they aren't likely to try to make a
lot of trouble for one another. After he has been around for a while,
an ombudsman becomes Government-minded." In support of his thesis
he remarks that no Ombudsman has brought to light a single major
scandal during the thirty-odd years of virtually continuous Social
Democratic control over the Government.10 So long a rule, in his opin-
ion, would certainly have produced skeletons that a diligent searcher
might have found hidden in political closets. When asked to comment
on this remark, Ombudsman Bexelius answered sharply: "This office
has had no part in cleaning up large scale corruption in public ad-
ministration because, fortunately, it has not existed. If we had any
reason to suspect it, nothing at all would stand in the way of our in-
vestigation."'17 His confidence is widely shared by Swedes. As an admirer
These are, however, such rare occurrences that, for practical purposes, the Ombudsman's
parliamentary contact may be said to be exclusively with the First Law Committee.
16. The Social Democrats have remained in power as the Government since 1932
except for one hundred days in 1936 and a period during World War II when a coalition
cabinet was formed. They receive only about fifty per cent of the votes, but the balance are
are spread among so broad a spectrum of opposition parties that parliamentary overturn
has not been much of a threat.
Despite the long domination of the socialists, Sweden is not a very socialistic country.
Of those employed at the time of the 1960 census, 89 per cent were employed by private
enterprises, 5 per cent by producer or consumer cooperatives, I per cent by municipal
governments, and only 5 per cent by the national government in all its aspects.
17. In one of his writings, the Ombudsman expressed a similar thought: "Certainly,
the things that the JO's office has accomplished during the past 150 years are not very
great or sensational. There have not been any general dean-ups of corrupt officials.
Neither has the activity of the commissioners involved them in a dangerous struggle
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has put it, "The importance of the office cannot be measured by the
scandals it has revealed but rather by the absence of any major scan-
dals."18
Tim OMBUDSMAN'S POWER
The Ombudsman is by no means a super-administrator, empowered
to overturn every error and to produce correct answers to all the diffi-
cult questions modem government confronts. The Constitution (Art.
96) says simply that, as a representative of the Parliament and pursuant
to its instructions, he should "supervise the observance of laws and
statutes" as they may be applied "by the courts and by public officials
and employees."' 9 Supervision, as Parliament's instructions make clear,
does not include control over what judges or administrators do. The
Ombudsman gives no orders. He cannot reverse a decision he deems
improper; he cannot even direct the reopening of a case or the recon-
sideration of a judgment by the officials who rendered it. What he can
do, primarily, is prosecute an official he believes to be guilty of the
crime of "breach of duty," marked by the official's non-observance of
statutory commands because he was careless, imprudent, or unskilful.2 0
Similarly, he can commence disciplinary proceedings leading to a re-
buke, a fine, a suspension or removal from office.
In aid of those powers the Ombudsman has practically unlimited
access to official files and records; he may call on any official for an
explanation of his acts; he may demand the opinions of superiors con-
cerning lowlier officials. He even has the right (which he almost never
exercises) to be present as a silent observer during the deliberations of
all courts and administrative bodies.
Because punishment for a past mistake is a rather antiquated way
of encouraging sound administration, Ombudsmen have for many years
against injustice, simply because-disregarding social injustices outside the field assigned
to the office-corruption of justice has not existed. No, the activity of the office has been
on another plane... ." A. Bexelius, The Swedish Institution of the Justitieombudsman,
27 INT. R.v AxniN. Sc. 243, 255 (1961). And see also the same author's The Ombudsman
for Civil Affairs, in RowAT, op. cit. supra note 14, at 22, 36-37.
18. N. Andrdn, The Swedish Ombudsman, ANGLO SEDISH REv. 1, 7 (192).
19. Since 1915 the Constitution has also provided an ombudsman for military affairs.
with the same qualifications and chosen in the same manner as the ombudsman for
civil affairs. The Militieombudsman is to "supervise matters which by law are regarded
as military, or affect employees remunerated from the appropriations for the armed
forces." This work had previously been part of the Justitieombudsman's responsibilities.
See H. Henkow, The Ombudsman for Military Affairs, in RowAT, op. cit. supra note 14, 51.
20. See p. 8 supra. Before launching a prosecution, the Ombudsman is required, by
parliamentary instructions, to afford the supposed offender a chance to justify or excuse
himself.
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tended to lessen their reliance on penal sanctions and have instead
developed the practice of "giving reminders" to erring officials. At first
without explicit authorization by Parliament (but more recently with
that body's full awareness and consent), the Ombudsmen have com-
mented on faults without launching prosecutions, in the belief that an
admonition will influence not only the official immediately involved,
but also others who may deal with similar matters in the future. Re-
minders vastly outnumber prosecutions by the Ombudsman. During
the five years 1960-1964 inclusive, he initiated a total of only thirty-
two punitive proceedings (twenty-seven prosecutions and five other
disciplinary actions). During the same period he issued 1220 repri-
mands, suggestions, and the like. When admonishing, the Ombudsman
does much more than simply rap the knuckles of an inattentive official.
Rather, he prepares a reasoned opinion that, like the opinion of an
American appellate court, may have considerable educational force.
Behind the admonitory lecture lurks a thinly veiled threat to prosecute
if the admonition be ignored.21
A few official matters are beyond the Ombudsman's reach. He has
no power to deal with the Concillors of State-the Cabinet Ministers
--who are subject to being impeached only upon the initiative of Par-
liament. 22 As a corollary of his incapacity to proceed against ministers,
21. Consider, as an example, 1964 REPORT OF THE OMBUDSMAN, at 164: A defendant,
acquitted after prosecution for perjury initiated upon the complaint of a private person,
afterwards complained to the Ombudsman that the trial court judge had not examined
the complainant before the trial, as he should have done according to an applicable
procedural rule. The judge, in response to the Ombudsman's inquiry, expressed belief
that the rule imposed no such duty. Having reviewed the pertinent legislative history,
the Ombudsman disagreed with the judge; he remarked that examining the complainant
is especially important in privately-initiated prosecutions of this character, and explained
the possibly harmful consequences of failing to do so at an early stage of the proceeding.
Then he added: "Since the examination did ultimately occur and there is no reason to
believe that Judge Rune was improperly motivated in refusing to act or that he will
hereafter fail to apply these rules, I leave the matter without further action."
22. Members of the Supreme Court or the Supreme Administrative Court, by contrast
with Ministers, can be (but never have been) impeached by the Ombudsman. Swedish
Const. Art. 101.
The present Ombudsman has adopted a policy of remaining altogether silent about
Supreme Court matters unless (as has not yet occurred) a major fault were to come to
light that would justify impeachment.
A former Ombudsman felt free in 1935 to tell the Supreme Court that it had wrongly
applied a statute in a decedent's estate matter; the parties themselves had not noted
the error, but it came to light during a law students' seminar. The judges, thus informed
by the Ombudsman, obediently compensated the party who had lost the case because
of the judges' imperfect reading of the Civil Code. (At least one prominent Swedish jurist
argues that the Supreme Court justices, having made "an obvious mistake," should have
been impeached had they not compensated the losing party. American judges, who make
[Vol. 75: 1
THE SWEDISH JUSTITIEOMBUDSMAN
he cannot review the propriety of a judgment of the King in Council,
upon appeal from an administrative decision; but this does not at all
restrict his ability to deal with a matter that could still be appealed
to that august body, for access to the Ombudsman is not blocked by
any requirement that other remedies first be exhausted.2 He does not
have power over government corporations engaged in economic opera-
tions, for which conventional governmental procedures are thought to
be unsuitable. Finally, the Ombudsman's power to inquire into cases
concerning local government is limited.
Until 1957 the Ombudsman was competent to act only in matters of
national administration. Drawing the line between national and local
administration is not always easy in Sweden because municipal author-
ities have long shared in executing nationwide programs as the paid
agents, as it were, of central administrative bodies. Despite considerable
opposition at the time, Parliament instructed the Ombudsman in 1957
(pursuant to a constitutional amendment) to concern himself with
what are traditionally local governmental affairs, with special regard
for the municipalities' right of self-government. The popularly elected
members of local assemblies remain wholly outside the range of the
Ombudsman's attention. Moreover, acts of municipal administrators
that can be appealed further within the locality and that are subject
to correction by the local legislature or otherwise are not handled by
the Ombudsman unless personal liberty is immediately endangered.
These limitations are reinforced by the present Ombudsman's policy of
being somewhat slower to criticize local administrators than those who
are attached to national organs. Even so, a substantial (and growing)
part of the Ombudsman's work pertains to previously immune muni-
cipal affairs.24
many mistakes deemed obvious by law review editors, are not expected to achieve per-
fection in order to escape impeachment.)
A still earlier Ombudsman, who had unsuccessfully sought to prosecute a high official
and whose appeal to the Supreme Court had been rejected, gave a strongly critical account
of the matter in his next report to Parliament, concluding that the court's decision
"places in a strange light the opinions which now prevail in the King's Supreme Court."
A. Bexelius, The Swedish Institution of the Justitieombudsman, 27 INr. REv. ADmnN. Sc.
243, 251 (1961).
23. The present Ombudsman has in fact suggested informally on several occasions
that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies should be made operative as to him, but
Parliament has been unresponsive. At times a case has been appealed to the King in
Council and simultaneously has been made the basis of a complaint to the Ombudsman.
"In those situations," the present Ombudsman remarked, "the ministers tend to wait for
me to do something and I tend to wait for them to do something. But usually I give in
first and go ahead with the matter."
24. The classification of cases in the Ombudsman's annual reports prevents a com-
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THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE OMBUDSMAN'S WORK
The Ombudsman is more than a complaint bureau to which out-
raged citizens may turn. As Parliament's watchman, he can and does
proceed on his own motion when problems come to his attention
through newspaper stories, personal conversation, suggestions by offi-
cials themselves, or his own periodic inspection of courts and adminis-
trative agencies. Numerically, as the table below shows, citizens' com-
plaints account for eighty-six per cent of the cases docketed by the
Ombudsmen in recent years. The Ombudsman thinks, however, that
his observations during inspections probably produce the most signifi-
cant leads to official fault or carelessness, though they give rise to only
thirteen per cent of his caseload.
TABLE I. Sources of New Cases Docketed by Ombudsman
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Citizens' complaints 983 983 960 1224 1239
Initiated on basis of newspaper stories 15 14 14 16 11
Initiated as a result of inspection
or other information 211 83 189 156 179
The range of subject matter comprehended by these cases is impres-
sive, as appears from even a cursory examination of Table II below.
In every year included in this summation, real or imagined derelictions
by judges were the most numerous category of matters before the
Ombudsman, while officials whose work is intimately connected with
judicial administration were also frequently involved. On the other
hand, the administration of social insurance and related "welfare state"
activities was not a dominant element of the Ombudsman's caseload,
nor were taxation disputes a major feature of his concern. These ob-
servations concerning the Ombudsman's work are emphasized here
because both Swedish and foreign commentators have sometimes
stressed that the Ombudsman system is especially needed in societies
with elaborate social welfare and tax administrations. The available
figures suggest, on the contrary, that the Ombudsman plays a minor
part in resolving the undoubtedly numerous controversies that arise
between citizens and officials in those fields. Those controversies are
dealt with by other means, especially designed for the purpose.
pletely accurate counting of what might be called purely municipal cases. Excluding all
doubtful cases, however, one finds an average of 73 municipal matters dealt with in the
three years 1957-1959, and an average of 130 during the next four years, 1960-1963.
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TABLE H1. Subject Matters Involved in Docketed Cases
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Courts (excluding admin-
istrative courts) 210 171 178 241 226
Public prosecutors 123 171 81 103 10
Police authorities 190 101 168m 213a 208
Distraining authorities 40 35 44 55 43
Prison administration 111 123 105 146 163
Mental hospitals 91 110 123 102 114
Other hospitals 27 28 19 31 46
Care of alcoholics 24 16 21 18 31
Child and youth welfare 29 32 53 50 59
Real property controls 31 33 44 42 47
School administration 20 11 24 36 34
Tax authorities 35 37 66 53 55
State monopolies 8 13 14 17 22
Church authorities 20 32 14 19 12
National administration
not included above 150 182 181 183 195
Municipal administration
not included above 78 59 58 81 87
Miscellaneous--outside
Ombudsman's jurisdiction 118 117 86 130 90
a Police matters were subdivided for the first time in 1962 into those pertaining to
criminal law enforcement and those pertaining to other affairs (such as license issuance
and revocation). The breakdown in 1962 was 99 criminal, 69 other;, in 1963, 134 criminal,
79 other.
A mere counting of cases tells little about their significance and
nothing about their disposition. We turn, therefore, to discussion of
the Ombudsman's treatment of the matters before him.
PRIVATE CoMPLAINT CASES
Anyone can complain to the Ombudsman-a citizen about an official,
an official about an official, a lawyer or the Bar Association about a
judge, one judge about another, an organization in behalf of its mem-
bers. Some of the Ombudsman's clients are steady customers-"queru-
lants"--whose repeated communications may reflect emotional disturb-
ance or mental disease, but must nevertheless be considered. Some
twenty percent of all incoming complaints are summarily disposed of,
with no action other than a notification that the Ombudsman perceives
no cause to intervene. Many are "crank" letters, sometimes altogether
incoherent or filled with fanciful tales of high-level conspiracies and
persecutions25 Others pertain to private or public corporations over
25. The Ombudsman's staff is aware, however, that one correspondent well known
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which the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Few are discarded because
they reflect ancient grievances; the Ombudsman is willing to docket
complaints about episodes that occurred as long as ten years ago. 20
Of the approximately one thousand complaints each year, only about
twenty-five are signed by lawyers either in their own behalf or on
behalf of clients, though a few others may have been prepared by law-
yers for their clients' signatures.2 7 No artistry is needed. The Ombuds-
man's office deems one of its virtues to be its capacity to extract
meaning from obscurely described-and, indeed, vaguely perceived-
dissatisfactions. Roughly, the complainants include about seven hun-
dred private citizens (many of whom file more than one complaint), the
balance of the cases coming from organizations or officials.
From the complainant's point of view the great advantage of re-
course to the Ombudsman is that no further effort (and no expenditure
whatsoever) is demanded. The Ombudsman takes over the case as one
to be pursued in the public interest. This, among other things, has
often obviated the necessity of the complainant's utilizing remedies that
may still be available to him within the judicial or administrative
process. 28 True, the Ombudsman cannot quash an act he finds to be
improper nor order additional moves to rectify the wrong done to the
complainant. But many complainants are seemingly willing to sur-
render control over their own cases in the hope that criticism by the
for his excited imaginings finally complained about an impropriety in the manner of
collecting taxes. Investigation showed the complaint to be well founded, and corrective
steps were accordingly suggested. Recollection of that instance encourages attentiveness
to every complaint, regardless of its source.
26. Experienced observers agree that "long term cases" almost invariably have strong
psychiatric overtones. The Ombudsman's tolerance of these old grudges reflects Sweden's
ten-year statute of limitations in tort actions.
27. Practicing lawyers in Sweden have a somewhat lesser role in the conduct of day-
to-day affairs than do their American counterparts, perhaps simply because they are less
numerous. Fully qualified advocates number only about 1200, though other lawyers may
carry professional responsibilities without using the title of advocate.
28. This continues to be a controversial aspect of the Ombudsman system. In many
instances the Ombudsman is burdened with cases that might well have been dealt with
elsewhere just as cheaply and conveniently. So, for example, a complaint concerning
brutality by a policeman or prison guard may be lodged initially with the Ombudsman
and will be inquired into by him even though the complainant has never reported the
matter to the offender's superiors, who, had they been apprised of the matter, might
themselves have investigated and then initiated suitable punitive action. Only If the
superiors are insufficiently attentive to the complaint should the Ombudsman have to be-
come involved. Without an all-embracing rule that available remedies must invariably
be exhausted before recourse is had to the Ombudsman, his responsibilities could well




Ombudsman will induce some further and more favorable official step,
or even, in extreme cases, the payment of damages.
The processing of complaints may be described briefly as follows:
The Ombudsman personally reads the incoming complaints and,
indeed, often opens the envelopes that contain them. This extreme
manifestation of the Ombudsman's personal responsibility for his
work is linked with organizational problems to which later reference
will be made. The opened letters, sometimes bearing the Ombudsman's
suggestions concerning next steps, are docketed and are then taken to
the Chief of Office, a permanent employee of long standing. He decides
whether or not to request the official body involved in the complaint
to forward the pertinent files for the Ombudsman's examination. He
often hands over to the Deputy Ombudsman cases that may be dis-
posed of at once. Others are referred to a staff member for further
analysis along with the relevant documents when they are received.
Some, but not much, specialization exists within the staff. When the
staff member is prepared for the next step-which may be dismissal
of the complaint, a request for further information, or whatnot-he
prepares a draft for approval by the Ombudsman or the Deputy Om-
budsman. Staff members do not themselves communicate informally
with officials to discuss the facts or the implications of the matters be-
fore them; they work exclusively with papers. The personalization of
the Ombudsman's work again comes to the fore in this context. Several
officials in 1964 recalled having received telephone calls from the
Ombudsman himself, who then proceeded to ask questions about an
apparently minor complaint received by him in that morning's mail.
By far the greatest part of the complaints are disposed of quickly
after the official fies have been received in the Ombudsman's office.
In most of these instances the Ombudsman's staff assistant can perceive
an allowable basis of the decision complained against. The Ombudsman
or the Deputy then sends a letter to the complainant, explaining in
some detail why the original official action seems unobjectionable.
The Ombudsman has on several occasions urged Parliament to require
courts and administrative organs to state reasons for their decisions,
believing that had they done so in the past, many of the persons who
have complained to him would have been satisfied with the actions
taken. In his view, mystification engenders dissatisfaction which could
be dispelled by official explications, but his recommendations have not
yet been followed. At any rate, many persons who have filed vigorous
protests seem to have been made content by the Ombudsman's reasoned
explanations. The Ombudsman adds, with philosophical resignation,
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that even when the complainant continues to be unhappy with the
outcome, he transfers his dissatisfaction to the Ombudsman so that
future relations with the body complained against become less strained.
The present work method does, however, place on the Ombudsman's
staff the burdensome responsibility of reviewing sometimes extensive
documentary material to ascertain whether it lends legal, evidential,
and technical support to a judgment reached elsewhere. Ombudsmen
in other Scandinavian countries handle the matter somewhat differ-
ently. A complaint not dismissible on its face is sent to the affected
official agency for comment; the agency's explanation is then forwarded
to the complainant, who often accepts the reasons stated; only if the
complainant questions the adequacy of the agency's answer does the
Ombudsman's office demand all the pertinent papers for independent
analysis. Thus unnecessary shuffling of papers back and forth is avoided.
Even the more cumbersome Swedish system does, nevertheless, man-
age to dispose of the bulk of the complaints reasonably quickly. During
the first six months of 1964, for example, the Ombudsman closed 666
cases. Of these, fifty-one per cent had been in the office for less than a
month; twelve per cent, one to two months; six per cent, two to three
months; fourteen per cent, three to six months-a total of eighty-three
per cent disposed of within six months after docketing. Signs of strain
are nevertheless apparent in the backlog of cases remaining undecided
at the end of a year; this number has mounted from 240 at the begin-
ning of 1961, to 278 (1962), 385 (1963), 430 (1964), and 447 (1965).
Most complaints can be dismissed because their invalidity is at once
clear or is disclosed by staff examination of the relevant documents.
The Ombudsman's statistics do not reveal directly how many com-
plaints led to affirmative steps by him, but one may infer from the
figures shown in the table below that only a small number have been
found to be justified; the estimate offered informally by experienced
persons is "roughly ten per cent" of the total received.
TA.Bsz III. Ombudsman's Disposition of Docketed Cases
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Referral to other authorities 13 15 17 4 12 3
Withdrawn by complainant 8 5 12 15 10 12
Dismissed without inquiry 184 263 190 217 287 381
Dismissed after inquiry 619 669 592 620 746 722
Prosecutions 5 8 7 4 6 2
Disciplinary proceedings 0 2 0 2 1 0
Admonitions or other remarks 247 271 208 192 275 283
Proposals for new legislation
or rules 8 5 16 2 14 7
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Redress for injured individuals is, in a sense, only a by-product of
the Ombudsman's activity. His primary interest is in securing sounder
government in the future. If, however, the Ombudsman concludes
that a license has been wrongfully denied or that private property has
been illegally seized or that a privilege has been arbitrarily withheld,
the official whose action has been criticized almost invariably takes
steps to put the matter aright, even though he cannot be commanded
to do so. Furthermore, the Ombudsman sometimes expressly suggests
than an official pay damages to a wronged complainant, intimating
that failure to do so will indicate the official's adherence to a position
the Ombudsman deems so clearly illegal as to be a prosecutable
offense. A less debatable exercise of authority occurs when the Om-
budsman, having found injury to a citizen by an unidentifiable official,
suggests that the Government should pay damages out of the public
purse-as, for example, when a person has been assaulted by a police-
man who cannot later be singled out from the mass. The Ombudsman's
recommendations in this type of case have not invariably been accepted,
but they at least partially take the place of the cumbersome legislative
measures often needed in similar circumstances in the United States.30
In another and more important respect, the Ombudsman may help
wronged individuals. Release from improper detention is not easily
achieved in Sweden, where the writ of habeas corpus has no precise
analogy. Persons in custody may perhaps sue those who have restrained
their liberty, but the possibility that their custodians may later be
punished or be compelled to pay damages is considerably less alluring
than immediate freedom. The Ombudsman, if persuaded that a con-
viction has been wrongfully obtained or that a sentence is excessive,
has sometimes successfully sought pardons or shortened terms of im-
29. This practice has led to considerable criticism of the Ombudsman, who has been
charged with using the threat of prosecution to induce acceptance of his opinion con-
cerning debatable propositions of law. Compare S. J.gerskicld, The Swedish Ombudsman,
109 U. PA. L. RELv. 1077, 1089-90 (1961): "In the most extreme case, after the Ombudsman
had stated that he would abstain from prosecuting the judges of a court of appeals if
they would pay compensation to a citizen whose case they had decided (wrongly, it was
said), the judges informed the Ombudsman that while they adhered to their earlier
opinion, they would voluntarily pay the damages demanded because they did not want
to be subjected to the inconvenience of a prosecution. Thus we have the remarkable
outcome that qualified judges of an appellate court were forced to submit to consequences
which only an adverse judgment on their conduct should have produced, despite the
fact that the judges held fast to an opinion contrary to that of the Ombudsman." The
same episode, involving the Stockholm Court of Appeals, is noted more approvingly in
S. D. Anderman, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 11 AM. J. Cohip. L 225, 235 (1962).
For further discussion of this issue, see pp. 49-51, in!ra.
50. Compare IV. Gellhorn & L. Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims against
the United States, 55 CoLUM. L R-v. 1 (1955).
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prisonment when avenues of direct judicial redress had been closed
by the lapse of time.31 And he has seen to it, too, that persons held
against their will to receive treatment for alcoholism or psychiatric
problems have someone to whom they can cry for help.82
In another type of case the Ombudsman may relieve an individual
from uncertainty that in the United States could be resolved by a de-
claratory judgment, a procedure not available in Sweden. An illustra-
tive example is afforded by a controversy that arose when a fish and
game warden threatened a fisherman with prosecution if he would not
cease using certain nets. The fisherman, believing (but not being abso-
lutely sure) that his conduct was within the law, had either to surrender
or risk being penalized. He halted his fishing as commanded, but
simultaneously complained to the Ombudsman that the official had
arbitrarily interfered. After investigation the Ombudsman ruled against
the complainant, thus in effect providing the declaratory judgment for
which Swedish law makes no provision. To be sure, his opinion has no
binding force, since if the matter were later brought before a court, the
issues would be for the judges to decide. In actuality, however, his
analysis of the applicable law, whether favorable to the complainant
or to the official, is likely to be accepted as finally dispositive of the
point in question.
In general, however, personal redress is not a likely outcome of
complaints to the Ombudsman, though no doubt many an individual
has gained keen inner satisfaction when the Ombudsman has given a
31. What has been said about the Ombudsman's attention to these cases should not
be taken as suggesting that others in Sweden are insensitive to matters of that nature. On
the contrary, the Minister of Justice himself twice weekly receives, without prior appoint-
ment, any caller who wishes to present a plea for clemency or other relief in behalf of
someone in official custody.
52. In one case somewhat difficult to classify the Ombudsman concluded that a patient
should be ousted from a mental institution against his will. First hospitalized in 1921
as a dangerous schizophrenic, the patient was found to be no longer dangerous in 1915
and was told that he could depart. He refused to do so unless the doctors would certify
him to be "perfectly healthy," which they were unwilling to do. The patient was left
completely at large, except that he had to be in bed in the hospital ward at ten o'clock
each night. From 1935 to 1958 the patient remained in the hospital, "on strike" (as he
said) and refusing to participate in work programs. In 1958 the patient complained to
the Ombudsman that despite his being in good mental health, he had been detained by
the hospital authorities. The Ombudsman expressed the opinion that the doctors should
have excluded the patient from the hospital in 1935 and at all times afterward, since
whether or not he was as "perfectly healthy" as he believed, he was by the doctors' own
account well enough not to take up hospital space. So the patient was sent away, still
without his desired certificate. Now living comfortably as an old age pensioner, he




judge or an official a rebuke or "reminder." Arrogance unfortunately
can be a widespread occupational disease among judges. It stings even
when it does not monetarily wound those who encounter it. The
Ombudsman has spoken sternly, for example, to judges who have bad-
gered witnesses and lawyers without committing reversible errors, and
this has perhaps been a form of personal vindication of the complain-
ants as well as a suggestion for the future.33 "There is no reason why
a judge cannot behave like a gentleman," the present Ombudsman
remarked in a recent conversation. He believes that his and his prede-
cessors' "countless reminders" have gained force by repetition and have
definitely influenced the behavior patterns of all civil servants, includ-
ing judges.
These remarks would mislead if they were to suggest that most
grievances-or even the most important grievances-are brought to the
Ombudsman. The contrary is assuredly the case.
Even in areas with which he is accustomed to deal, matters are, in
the main, settled finally without recourse to him. So, for example, the
Central Medical Board in 1962 acted upon 1,560 complaints concern-
ing the administration of mental hospitals under its control, and in
1963 it disposed of 1,878 complaints of that nature; in those years,
the complaints to the Ombudsman from the same sources numbered
123 and 102, respectively.
Moreover, spokesmen for many major elements of Swedish life indi-
cated flatly during interviews in 1964 that the Ombudsman had no
significance for them or their members despite their having frequent
and important contacts with other public authorities. Among those
consulted were such diverse groups as associations of retail enterprises,
civil servants, school teachers, labor unions, shipping concerns, forest
owners, insurance companies, agriculturists, heavy industries, and
banks. Even among the unorganized elements of society, such as those
who use free legal aid services and those who are touched by social
insurance or public health administration, recourse to the Ombuds-
33. An individual complaint may generate a more sweeping inquiry. In 1964, for in.
stance, a complaint asserted that a judge had insulted a witness and had conducted a
needlessly noisy hearing. The Ombudsman telephoned acquaintances in that district to
inquire informally about the judge's handling of cases. Upon learning from several sources
that the judge had a reputation for irascibility, boisterousness, and disregard of the
sensibilities of persons in the courtroom, the Ombudsman decided to investigate more
extensively than the original complaint might have warranted, with the likelihood of
prosecuting rather than simply admonishing the intemperate judge. "His loss of respect
in the community," the Ombudsman commented, "will be offset by increased respect for
the court, because the people will know that the State will not allow judges to behave
in that manner."
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man is so rare as to be all but disregarded. Nobody among those inter-
viewed intimated that the Ombudsman was useless, even though wholly
unused by the particular group to which the speaker belonged. All
agreed, in fact, that the Ombudsman is, as one man said, "a good
safety valve for the community" when no other means of securing
suitable official attention may exist. They also agreed, however, that
regularized methods of obtaining specialized review have been brought
into being in modern times, so that the citizen with a problem is no
longer helpless beneath a bureaucratic thumb, as perhaps lie once
was. "In olden days," a representative of a large economic interest
declared, "everybody needed the Ombudsman because there was no
place else to turn when an official or a judge did something outra-
geous. The office holders had all the power and people couldn't stand
up against them. Nowadays if we have a problem, we usually have a
good route to follow in order to get suitable attention. In my opinion,
not very many normal people are likely to complain to the Ombuds-
man. As a generality, he gets the unduly combative, the hyper-sensitive,
the off-beat types, while others look for more direct channels and then
go through them."
While this is undoubtedly an overstated opinion, it seems essentially
sound. Swedes do like the idea behind the Ombudsman and are
happy to have his office as a protection in reserve. But a general
bureau of complaints is an inefficient means of dealing with modem
government's many complexities. Sweden's sophisticated citizenry
chooses to use sophisticated review procedures when they are available.
THE OMBUDSMAN'S INSPECTION
In times when judges were few, governmental activities were limited,
and office holders were measured by tens rather than by tens of thou-
sands, direct and frequent inspection by the Ombudsman may have
been practicable. The idea of personal inspection by him continues
even today, despite changed conditions. As a matter of tradition the
Ombudsman is expected to inspect every official establishment, in-
cluding every court, at least decennially. Far from proclaiming the
impossibility and the questionable value of this assignment, the Om-
budsman asserts that periodic inspections are the surest guarantees of
his success. He valiantly attempts to cover the whole of Sweden by
devoting six weeks of each year to field trips among courts and ad-
ministrative agencies. In truth, he has been unable to absent himself
from his office for so long a period. As a consequence, general inspec-
tion (whatever may be its true worth) does not exist in fact, though
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many Swedes in and out of public office prefer to ignore reality and
to assume that the Ombudsman is, as it were, constantly peering over
official shoulders.
While inspections are perforce less frequent and perhaps less search-
ing than popularly supposed, they do occur in substantial numbers.
On very short notice, and sometimes on none at all, the Ombudsman
and members of his staff appear in an office to examine its records.
In trial courts the docket book is reviewed to ascertain whether cases
are being brought to trial seasonably. The files of tventy-five civil
cases and twenty-five criminal cases are drawn at random, to be re-
viewed on the spot and to be sent to Stockholm for more leisurely
analysis if the judge's record-keeping or observance of the laws seems
questionable. Prosecutors' records are checked to ascertain whether
suspected persons' rights have been observed during investigations and
whether defendants have been prosecuted without delay. Institutions
-prisons in particular-are physically examined with respect to sani-
tation and the like, and inmates are invited to present grievances.
In the main, inspection means looking into the files since most govern-
mental operations are not subject to direct sensory perception. In-
formal conversation relieves the boredom of this rummaging through
piles of papers, and makes possible an exchange of information that
may be valuable to both the inspectors and the inspected.
One must consciously avoid idealizing the inspection process. In-
spections do not in fact reach every corner of the nation. An experi-
enced officer in a community distant from Stockholm could recall no
inspection during his thirty years of service; time has not as yet allowed
a thorough examination of all the municipal and communal affairs that
came within the Ombudsman's jurisdiction in 1957; in some fields of
national responsibility, of which social insurance and health adminis-
tration are notable examples, inspections by the Ombudsman are virtu-
ally unheard of. Having said that much, one must add that the Om-
budsman and his staff do apparently accomplish surprisingly much
during their field trips, despite the broad range of specialized activities
this non-specialist group must seek to understand.
The chief administrative officials of two large provinces,34 inter-
34. Twenty-five provinces (or counties or districts) are headed by governors appointed
by the Cabinet, who may be removed but who are in practice permanent. They are
staffed by dvil servants, the most important of whom is the Province Secretary. The
provincial administrations have many direct responsibilities as the regional executors of
national authority. They also serve as reviewing bodies to which appeals may be taken
from activities of agencies of the roughly 1000 communes, such as the committees dealing
with child welfare and public assistance. Appellate decisions of the provincial govern.
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viewed separately while the memory of the Ombudsman's most recent
visitation was still green, used almost identical words in evaluating
the inspection process. "The Ombudsman's staff," they said, "some-
times picks up mistakes we have been overlooking. They question
things we have been taking for granted." In each instance the official
drew from his desk the report the Ombudsman had sent by way of
reviewing his inspection-seventeen pages, in one instance-with the
recipient's own underlinings and annotations, and with indications that
segments of the report had been brought to subordinates' attention. The
storage of "Secret Documents" bearing on civil defense, the time delay
in acting upon licenses because applications passed through too many
hands, the inadequate consideration of alternatives to detaining a
juvenile delinquent, the proper way to measure the running of a six
months' stay of judgment when an appeal has been taken from the pro-
vincial government to the King in Council, the extent to which the
province could delegate to a municipal agency the power to hold a
supposedly dangerous alcoholic in custody, and the non-observance
of certain requirements concerning placing stamps on documents were
among the topics discussed. This is a mixed bag of rather small game.
If provincial governments need reminders about such things, one won-
ders whether the widely separated visitations of the Ombudsman should
be relied upon as the chief means of supervision and stimulation.
Judges and prosecutors with whom the matter was discussed in 1964
endorsed even more strongly than provincial administrators the utility
of the Ombudsman's inspections. A provincial prosecutor, responsible
for supervising a number of police chiefs and prosecutors whose offices
he himself inspected at least biennially, thought the Ombudsman's
visits a desirable guarantee of his own vigilance. "I might become too
good friends with my police chiefs in the course of time, you see," he
explained-thus recalling the ancient question, who will watch the
watchman? An unusually outspoken judge who had at one time crossed
swords with the Ombudsman asserted that inspections sometimes
brought to light oft-repeated miscarriages of justice, citing an instance
in which a judge had long and rigidly applied a statute that had been
repealed, a fact he learned only when the Ombudsman prosecuted
him for negligence. Even such glaring judicial oversights may not be
challenged by appeals to higher courts because, the judge asserted, the
advocates outside the major cities cannot be relied upon for the pro-
fessional skill needed to keep courts on the right track; the judges
ments are in turn reviewable by the Supreme Administrative Court or, in some fields,
by the King in Council.
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themselves, prodded by the Ombudsman as well as by the appellate
courts, must (he said) assume responsibilities that may elsewhere be
borne by the parties' lawyers. Another judge, whose words were echoed
by a colleague, spoke especially warmly of the opportunity an inspec-
tion gave him to discuss troublesome problems with a highly respected
jurist. "Sometimes," he remarked, "I have to apply complicated pro-
cedural rules that are somewhat unfamiliar, and it helps me to know
how the Ombudsman regards them or to learn what he can tell me
about the way other judges are dealing with that matter. And some-
times I hear that a statute is being interpreted in different ways in
various parts of the country, and I have found that discussion with
the Ombudsman or one of his assistants may be clarifying." Still an-
other judge commented: "The present Ombudsman is really a kind
fellow, and I don't think that many judges are afraid of him. But they
respect him enough not to want to be criticized by him, and so the
fact that he may drop in to have a look at their records tends to make
them more careful in their work." He added, however, that after
a recent inspection had led the Ombudsman to suggest a change in
handling default cases, "all six of the judges in this court agreed to-
gether to adopt the Ombudsman's suggestion, though all of us thought
we were right and he was wrong. That happens more often than you
would think. Theoretically we are not obliged to accept his advice,
but it is easier to do so than to make a fight over it. I'm not sure that
this always produces good results."
One broadly experienced trial court judge was markedly less ecstatic
than many others about the inspection process. The defects discerned
in the case files were, in his judgment, "just the small change of judi-
cial administration-somebody was brought to trial eight days after
arrest instead of after seven days, things like that." Then he added:
"All this talk about personal contact is exaggeration. Most of the con-
tact is with assistants, not with the Ombudsman. And, anyway, a per-
sonal contact that occurs once every ten years isn't much of a con-
tact."
At the same time, while minimizing the significance of the Ombuds-
man's visits to the courts, the judge made a further highly suggestive
comment: "Just as a public service, I am a member of the Child Wel-
fare Committee of this city. I am the only law-trained person there,
and I have the devil's own time getting the committee to do its work
properly. What the Child Welfare Committee needs is an inspection
by the Ombudsman about every other month."
This highlights a deficiency in the present system, which imposes
1965]
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on the Ombudsman so large a task of supervising everybody that he
cannot efficiently supervise anybody in particular. Sweden acutely
(though no doubt less acutely than many other countries) needs addi-
tional provision of regularized supervisory activity, educative work
among officials on the job, continuity and coordination of work by
the wielders of widely dispersed authority, and sustained attention to
organization and methods. The Ombudsman, with the best will in
the world and with the utmost devotion to duty, cannot fill that need;
but the very fact of his inspections may create undue complacency.
An example is supplied by a recent inspection of one of Sweden's
thirty major tax collection offices. After a general inspection that in-
cluded an examination of the files, the Ombudsman reported, in two
pages, that all was well from the legal point of view and that the work
of that office was being performed faithfully. No doubt this was an ac-
curate appraisal. What it omits is an expert evaluation of the entire
tax collection system, in which uniformity is cumbersomely achieved
by inflexible statutory commands that even specify in detail the head-
ings to be placed at the top of columns in the ledgers. The Ombuds-
man can perhaps say whether the tax collector is obeying those com-
mands, but he is not well equipped to say whether the commands
are suitably formulated, whether mechanization should replace hand-
work, whether computerization of tax records would be advantageous,
whether, in short, the tax collection office is as efficient as modern
management can make it be.
Using the Ombudsman as a general handyman instead of using
technical inspectors for technical matters is an anachronism. In the
nineteenth century the Ombudsmen then in office made tremendously
valuable social contributions by reporting what they, and they alone,
perceived in governmental establishments. The modernization of
Swedish penology, for example, is widely attributed to Ombudsmen
who were outraged by conditions in isolated prisons they had inspected.
Today the Ombudsman's are not the only outside eyes that looks
upon the jailers. Every prison in Sweden is inspected monthly by the
regional director of the National Prison Board.85 Annually it is in-
spected by a team of specialists-a structural engineer, an auditor,
and so on. In between, travelling inspectors of the National Prison
35. The National Prison Board directs and supervises all penal institutions. In 1963
these institutions had a daily average population of 5,163; 12,773 ncw prisoners were
admitted during the year. The Board (composed of a director general and four division




Board examine sanitation, kitchens, hospital quarters, and so on. Not-
withstanding the change from the days when nobody cared about
what happened to convicts behind walls, the Ombudsman continues
personally to inspect prisons, though with understandably less spec-
tacular results than his predecessors achieved. 30
Another demerit of the present inspection system is that it may
focus attention on some facet of an office's work without taking into
account other responsibilities that happen not to have come to notice
during a hurried visit. The experience of a large provincial prosecu-
tor's office is illustrative. That office, which was then exercising
supervisory authority over police as well as prosecutors, was inspected
recently for the first time since 1939. For several days two members
of the Ombudsman's staff examined official files; for a few hours the
Ombudsman himself conversed with the provincial prosecutor con-
cerning problems of law enforcement. In the end, the Ombudsman
had only one sharp criticism: the provincial prosecutor had failed ever
since 1957 to require policemen throughout the province to undergo
special training in the duties that would fall to them in case of war.
The Ombudsman, observing a statutory direction that such training
should be given, advised the prosecutor to mend his ways promptly.
Within a few months more than a hundred policemen were sum-
moned from their posts throughout the county and were instructed
in what they should do if war were to come (and they were to survive
its coming). "I wasn't going to argue the point," said the prosecutor,
"because he was right in describing that statute. The only trouble
is that we are terribly shorthanded here. I have been complaining for
years about the understaffing of the police forces in the eighteen dis-
tricts for which I am responsible. When we called in those men for
war training, of course we had to take them away from doing other
things the laws say we should do. We didn't suddenly have more
men or more time. We simply used the men and the time differently,
as the Ombudsman had said we should do. But if he were to come
36. In the spring of 1963, for example, the Ombudsman visited a central prison where
he learned (through the prison officials and not in spite of them) that discipline was
made difficult by the prisoners' possessing smuggled supplies of sleeping pills and "pep
pills." Seven months later the Ombudsman described this as a "serious problem" and
proposed that the risk of smuggling be lessened by abandoning the present practice of
allowing prisoners to see wives and sweethearts without being constantly under a guard's
eye. The prison governor felt that acceptance of this recommendation would create nm
and probably graver problems of maintaining discipline. The regional administrator
and the National Prison Board agreed with him. The Ombudsman's report has been
quietly ignored.
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back now, he could criticize us for having left something else undone
instead."
Another frequently heard criticism of the present inspection system
is that it stimulates over-attention to paperwork at the expense of
other activities. Since the Ombudsman is chiefly interested in docu-
mentary materials, both when he is making an inspection and when
he is investigating a complaint, exactitude in record-keeping and am-
plitude of writings may at times be indulged in not to protect the
persons to whom records and writings pertain, but to protect the
record-keepers and writers. How much of this is a conscious or un-
conscious reaction to the Ombudsman's power to demand data is
hard to say. One senior officer thinks that formality and detailed pa-
perwork are part of Sweden's tradition, not at all confined to govern-
mental offices. He adds, however, that this tradition "is very strongly
reinforced, I think, by the civil servant's awareness that he may be
prosecuted for any omission. That slows up everything because not
only do civil servants take pains to see that every comma is in pre-
cisely the right place, but they also like to distribute responsibility
over two or three other people whenever they can, and it takes time
to obtain approvals." This exaggerated care may cause considerable
hardship to those it purportedly safeguards. The Ombudsman has
several times called attention to delays in completing psychiatric ob-
servations of persons under arrest, who may have remained in custody
for as long as six months simply to ascertain their mental competence.
A qualified observer, asked whether this did not reflect a shortage of
psychiatrists, replied: "It's partly that, of course. But much of it is
just the doctor's feeling that he needs to write a treatise on each case,
so that nobody can subject him to criticism if his report is ever re-
viewed by someone else." 3T
Still, even if the Ombudsman's inspections are not the unmixed
37. 1964 REPORT OF THE OMBUDSMAN 82, discusses a number of complaints concerning
detention of persons for psychiatric observation beyond the normally allowable period
of six weeks. As early as the 1940's, the Ombudsman noted, his predecessors had voiced
criticism of this practice. Since then, efforts had been made to increase the available
institutional resources, so that the Ombudsman felt that he need take no further initiative
at this time. He repeated "certain previous suggestions aiming at temporary improve-
ment, such as using medical personnel from outside the prison organization, simplifying
the procedure, and shortening the reports." The present lengthy detentions "are Incom-
patible with basic principles of legal security" and every possible effort should be made
to eradicate "one of the darkest chapters in modern Swedish life."
An officer of the National Medical Board commented: "In one of our mental hospitals
with 1100 patients we have three full-time psychiatrists and one half.time man. They
are kept so busy writing reports they have little time left over for diagnosis or therapy."
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blessings and triumphal processions many Swedes think them to be,
they do produce some genuine accomplishments. Thus, inspections
made the Ombudsman aware of diverse methods used by courts in
determining whether tests showed an impermissible concentration of
alcohol in the blood of automobile drivers. Driving under the influence
of liquor is a stringently policed and heavily punished crime in Sweden.
A suspect is tested while in police custody, but since the test occurs
at some time subsequent to the driving itself, inferences must be
drawn as to what it would have shown if the blood sample had been
taken earlier. The Ombudsman, discovering that judges used a num-
ber of seemingly reasonable but nonetheless different formulas in
this "counting back" from the blood tests, asked two well qualified
scientists to help him analyze hundreds of case files drawn from var-
ious courts. Some of the courts, this analysis showed, in utter good
faith committed serious technical mistakes. The Ombudsman then
distributed to the judges and prosecutors a memorandum suggesting,
in accord with the scientific advice available to him, how blood tests
should be interpreted in the future. The need for harmonizing and
improving judicial practices in this regard might never have been
recognized-or, at any rate, not recognized so quickly-had the Om-
budsman not detected the problem in the course of making inspec-
tions.
In another instance the Ombudsman encountered, during an in-
spection, the question of whether the plaintiff in a divorce action
could prove the defendant's chronic alcoholism by summoning as a
witness a person who had had official contact with the defendant. The
answer to that question was far from clear. The Ombudsman con-
cluded that a court could properly receive testimony by the official
in some circumstances, which he set forth in his annual report for
the future guidance of judges who had previously been in doubt.s
Furthermore, the possibility that a dignitary of highest rank may
concern himself with individual injustices no doubt has the bene-
ficial effect of strengthening the sense of responsibility of those em-
powered to restrict freedom of the person.3 9 In many instances per-
sons may be too ignorant or too inert to assert their legal rights. In
such cases official malpractices come to light through inspections, if
38. For additional illustrative material, see RowAT, op. cit. supra note 14, at 32.
39. Personal liberty has always been one of the Ombudsman's paramount concerns,
and some of his major accomplishments have pertained to custodial practices he found
to be improper. See Anderman, oP. cit. supra note 29, at 234; Jigerskiold, op. cit. su pra
note 29, at 1098.
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at all. A moving testimonial to the significance of this fact came from
the lips of an administrator in a northern area who dealt with child
welfare problems. In that connection his administrative agency could
seize parents for non-support of their children and put them into
forced work programs;4 0 it could take children from homes in which
they were neglected; and it could detain juvenile delinquents. Dis-
cussing an inspection that had occurred in 1963 the administrator
characterized certain of the Ombudsman's criticisms as "superficial,"
"petty," "reflecting inexperience." He was then asked whether this
meant that Ombudsman's inspections served no purpose. "No, indeed,
it does not mean that," the administrator answered with great feeling.
"I can tell you this, if I had a child of my own under the jurisdiction
of an official body like this one, I would certainly want to have an
outside check on it. And I can't think of a better one than the Om-
budsman. I said that, in my opinion, the Ombudsman doesn't have
experience in the fields in which we in this office have to face real-life
problems every day, and this causes him to overlook some of our diffi-
culties when he makes suggestions about how we should do our job.
But he has the job of protecting human rights. He has plenty of ex-
perience there-vastly more than we have. It is far better for him
to be an expert in his own field than in ours, if it comes to making
a choice. We can stand being reminded that freedom is a part of the
welfare we are supposed to be thinking about." Three other officials,
present during the interview, indicated hearty agreement with their
colleague's spontaneous utterance.
Others have independently confirmed that an even remotely pos-
sible future inspection by the Ombudsman does influence present
behavior, especially in matters involving detention of the person. "How
do you think the Ombudsman would like that?" a superior was quoted
as having barked at a junior whose recommended action was being
40. Power to commit parents to "workhomes" was ended by a statute that took effect
on July 1, 1964. Routine inspections of the files of a "workhome" In 1958 had revealed
to the Ombudsman that some of those detained had not received charges or been heard
before adverse decisions were made. In other cases, "the real reason for failure to pay
for support was not lassitude or indifference but rather, for instance, an overwhelming
burden of support with regard to the family or physical or mental defects .... The cases
often concerned chronic alcoholics, who ought to have been taken care of by the sobriety
wards. Physical examinations were practically never made before deciding the case."
Bexelius, op. cit. supra note 17, at 249. The Ombudsman, while critical of the particular
institution that had been inspected, did not initiate any prosecutions. Instead, much more
constructively, he called upon the Cabinet to formulate general instructions for the guid-




rejected. Discussing a colleague's proposal to make an arrest on some-
what inconclusive evidence, an official said: "I told him I wouldn't
want to have such a case in my files if the Ombudsman were to come
around to look at them, and that was the end of that." A young pros-
ecutor acknowledged being conscious of saying to himself with con-
siderable frequency: "I must be careful with this case, because it is
just the kind the Ombudsman looks for." A former judge declared:
"I can't point to a specific matter, but the Ombudsman entered into
my thinking. He was a supervisory shadow, if I may put it so." A
more youthful judge added: "The Ombudsman seems to mie to per-
sonify The Law, the omnipotent force in Swedish administration." A
prison governor who had not experienced an inspection for nearly
ten years said: "Often when I'm making a decision, I ask myself, How
would the Ombudsman decide things? It has a good effect on me."
Having heard similar remarks uttered frequently and with seeming
sincerity, an interviewer must conclude that many officials do regard
the Ombudsman as a vigilant watchman-even though, in all proba-
bility, the watchman will not complete his rounds within the next
decade. Some of them, one suspects, are really consulting only their
own inner conscience, to which they have attached the Ombudsman's
title.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PRESS TO THE OMBUDSMAN'S WORK
The Swedish press plays an important role, both in stimulating the
activity of the Ombudsman and in publicizing its consequences. The
Ombudsman, as has been observed, may initiate investigations on
his own motion. Sometimes editorial exhortations bring issues to his
notice. Sometimes direct "tips" by journalists lead him to make fur-
ther inquiries. More frequently, newspaper stories written without
the Ombudsman in mind suggest to his practiced eye the possibility
of discovering "news behind the news." He has been especially vigi-
lant to discern the civil liberties implications of matters that may be
reported simply as interesting episodes of the day.
Thus, for example, in 1957 he plucked from the daily press an
account of a Lutheran pastor's having torn down posters advertising
an evangelical meeting of which he disapproved. In Sweden the clergy-
men of the tax-supported State Church perform such civil functions
as recordation of deaths and births, and are therefore regarded as
officials within the Ombudsman's reach. Dissatisfied with the pastor's
explanation of his attempt to exclude a religious competitor, the Om-
budsman suggested that the pastor's bishop should reprimand him.
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When the bishop demurred, the Ombudsman prosecuted the pastor
for interfering with religious freedom and the right of peaceable as-
semblage; the pastor was convicted and fined. In 1963 the Ombuds-
man again locked horns with the State Church when a pastor refused
to permit funds to be collected in his parish for certain activities in
which female clergy participated. A statute enacted in 1958 had for
the first time made possible the ordination of women as pastors of
the State Church. Seeking to interfere with the operation of the new
law, the Ombudsman said, was a breach of duty; and since the anti-
feminist pastor remained obdurately unrepentant (with his bishop's
blessing), the Ombudsman launched another prosecution, leading to
conviction and fine.
Just as the press makes business for the Ombudsman, so too does
he make business for the press. The sweeping principle of Swedish
law that the public's files should be open to the public indiscrimi-
nately41 means, among other things, that complaints mailed to the
Ombudsman can be read by journalists, as can his subsequent corre-
spondence with officials, their explanations and excuses, many of the
documentary materials that bear on the cases, and of course the re-
ports of the Ombudsman's own actions. A reporter for the Swedish
news association visits the Ombudsman's office every day to examine
the incoming mail, which in fact the reporter sometimes sees before
the Ombudsman himself has had a chance to read it; and copies of
all outgoing correspondence are also available for his perusal. The
reporter brings roughly a third of the incoming complaints to the at-
tention of members of the news association, either as items of local
interest, as "human interest" stories, or as matters of sufficient gen-
eral importance to claim the attention of the metropolitan press. While
the newspapers do not publish everything that comes to their notice,
complaints are frequently publicized before having been investigated.4-2
Time after time, civil servants, when discussing the Ombudsman's
work, bitterly denounced this practice as unfair to them because,
41. See p. 6, supra.
42. The largest Swedish daily newspaper printed during August and September 1964
a number of stories based entirely on current and as yet wholly unevaluated complaints.
The following are examples: The Ice Hockey Federation accused taxation authorities of
having exceeded their powers; a civilian lawyer attached to the United Nations peace.
keeping organization in the Congo accused taxation authorities of discriminating against
non-military personnel in applying tax regulations to persons temporarily abroad an
advocate in a small city in central Sweden accused a just-retired district judge of having
committed various improprieties, of which detailed examples were set forth, and of having
conducted judicial affairs so that "The office of the court resembled a castle accessible
only to persons with a specially designed key."
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though ninety per cent of the complaints are later found to be un-
sound, an official's subsequent exoneration is often less prominently
reported than the original accusation against him. The Ombudsman,
taking note of the officials' dissatisfaction, publicly suggested in 1961
that the civil servants' organizations and the newspaper publishers'
association should negotiate an agreement concerning press coverage.4 3
But the suggestion has thus far been ignored. The publishers' asso-
ciation denies any unfairness, pointing to its policy, binding on all
members, that news reports should be delayed until a person whose
reputation may be involved has had opportunity to tell his side of
the story. The policy is morally enforceable by the association's "court
of honor" to which injured individuals may complain. The "court"
-composed of a Supreme Court justice, journalists, and publishers-
cannot award damages, but its judgments (some thirty-odd each year)
are said to be regarded as "sentences" upon an improper publication.
They are widely reprinted and are thought to be influential. This,
the newspapers feel, is adequate protection of civil servants who may
be recklessly or simply mistakenly accused. The civil servants vigor-
ously dissent.
Another and less noticed consequence of publicizing complaints is
its deterrent effect upon some persons who might otherwise bring mat-
ters to the Ombudsman's attention.44 The legal adviser of a leading
bank, for instance, described what seemed to be an official impro-
priety, but added that the bank's officers, after considering the likeli-
hood of publicity were a complaint to be made, decided not to re-
port the occurrence to the Ombudsman. A lawyer, representing a
large commercial interest, spoke of episodes apparently suitable for
consideration by the Ombudsman but not communicated to him:
"We can look out for ourselves without his help and we simply don't
like to get mixed up in a newspaper controversy."
One has the impression that the Swedish press rather conscientiously
seeks to avoid needless embarrassment to complainants. For example,
a complaint by a person who has been detained as an alcoholic will
be published without using the complainant's name. Moreover, in
many instances the newspapers do not identify by name or specific
title the official complained against; they tend to discuss problems
and not persons. Perhaps no more can be asked. In any event, Parlia-
43. A. Bexelius, Hur JO-4mbetet arbetar, [1961] STATSVETENSKAPLIG TwsrDair 219.
44. The Ombudsman does not register anonymous complaints. In a few instances,
however, matters revealed by anonymous complaints have later been investigated by the
Ombudsman, ostensibly on his own motion.
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ment has shown no enthusiasm whatsoever for legislative proposals,
made from time to time, that publicity should be withheld until the
Ombudsman has completed his action upon a complaint.
Relations between the Ombudsman and the press are cordial,
though newspapers do not hesitate to criticize his judgments or to
urge more vigorous attention to this or that area of public administra-
tion. Responding to journalistic complaints against officials' reticence,
the Ombudsman has strongly upheld the newspapers' right to know.4"
Of course this has endeared the Ombudsman to newspapermen. As
one leading editor exclaimed, "We look upon the Ombudsman as
the responsible guardian of our freedom of the press, so we are eager
to cooperate with him."
Thanks to that cooperation, the Ombudsman's criticisms and sug-
gestions gain greatly added circulation. Editors with whom the mat-
ter was discussed acknowledged that they tended to emphasize cases
with "human interest angles," while underplaying concededly more
important matters that were "technical." A few of the most highly
respected daily papers do give considerable attention to the superfi-
cially unexciting topics the Ombudsman has dealt with, thus adding
to citizens' and officials' awareness of the Ombudsman's recommenda-
tions. At times they have built their own "editorial crusades" upon
ideas provided by the Ombudsman's findings. All in all, the press
has been a useful stimulator of Swedish interest in what might else-
where be regarded as dull information. A journalist who had himself
written much about the Ombudsman commented with satisfaction:
"Sweden is blessed by having good civil servants. The public has
come to expect high quality performances by them. When even a
minor civil servant makes a serious error, our readers think that find-
ing out about it is like reading a good detective story. It is a scandal
and they want us to tell them all about it. And that is exactly what
we try to do."
45. In 1962, for example, the Ombudsman criticized a hospital administration because
it withheld from newspapers the names of applicants for a vacancy in an important posi-
tion; the applicants had specifically requested confidentiality in order to avoid embarrass-
ment to them. Similarly, in August of 1964 the newspapers reported with obvious
satisfaction that the Ombudsman had demanded from the municipal government of
Lycksele an explanation of its not answering reporters' questions about who had applied
for an appointive post. Two of the three applicants had requested that their names not
be disclosed. The local authorities had honored this request in order to protect the ap-
plicants against possible unpleasantness in their present employment. The Ombudsman
obviously thought this an inadequate justification of silence, since in Sweden the right
of privacy has been so largely subordinated to the right of publicity.
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THE O uDsMAN AS UNOFFICIAL ADVISER
While the Ombudsman is known chiefly as critic and reformer, he
serves also, much less conspicuously, as cherished adviser.
Many judges and officials seek the Ombudsman's opinion concern-
ing matters upon which they have not yet acted. Quite properly, he
declines to give rulings concerning hypothetical as well as real cases.
He does not purport to be General Counsel to the Civil Establish-
ment. He recognizes, too, the danger of advising how to dispose of
problems whose facets may have been only partially revealed. Hence,
more resolutely than some of his predecessors, he flatly rejects formal
requests for opinions about pending cases.
He has been helpful, on the other hand, when a judge or other pub-
lic official has asked by telephone or letter whether the Ombudsman
has encountered a particular problem in the course of his work. In
such instances the Ombudsman makes available the knowledge he has
gained through the past performance of his duties. This, in a sense,
simply projects the conversational exchanges that may occur during
an inspection, when the Ombudsman gives and receives information
about the conduct of public business. It serves as a species of pre-
ventive therapy, for it encourages uniform statutory interpretation
and the utilization of correct procedures. A number of judges spoke
warmly of the benefits they had received from the Ombudsman's in-
formal advisory service-a service he does not mention in his annual
reports nor stress in his comments elsewhere.
RELATIONSHIP OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO OTHER PUBLIC WATCHMEN
The preceding discussion, focusing as it has on the Ombudsman
alone, may have suggested that he solitarily watches over Swedish law
administration. In fact the Ombudsman's powers and duties are shared
with others.
The Chancellor of Justice. Of most interest among the Ombuds-
man's fellow watchmen is the Chancellor of Justice. His office is the
direct lineal descendant of the King's Ombudsman whose creation
in the eighteenth century led to the nineteenth century demand for
a parliamentary counterpart 40 Today, though nominally still a "repre-
sentative of the Crown" and, according to the Constitution (Art. 27),
the "Supreme Ombudsman of the King," the Chancellor of Justice
holds a non-political post for life. Neither a member of the Cabinet
46. See pp. 1-2, supra. Compare S. Rudhobm, The Chancellor of Justice, in RowiAT.
op. cit. supra note 14, at 17.
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nor responsible to any minister, he is in fact entirely independent.
Like the Ombudsman, he heads his own staff, separate and apart from
all others. Unlike the Ombudsman, he submits no report to Parlia-
ment. The absence of that report is the chief vestigial remnant of
the Chancellor's having once upon a time been the monarch's agent.41
His functions are more varied than the Ombudsman's.48 But in
one important respect they are exactly parallel. About a quarter of
the Chancellor's and his small staff's time is devoted, as is the Ombuds-
man's, to receiving complaints from citizens and officials about judges
and other officials; 40 to inspection trips; to investigating, on his own
motion, matters discussed in the press or elsewhere; to admonishing,
sermonizing, formulating general recommendations, and prosecuting
those whose blunders are egregious or whose acceptance of guidance
is half-hearted. If one were to ask why two men, one called Justitieom-
budsman and one called Justitiekansler, should do exactly the same
work in exactly the same way affecting exactly the same people, but
without even a tenuous structural link between them, the only possi-
ble response would be Justice Holmes': "Upon this point a page of
history is worth a volume of logic."' 0
The activity of these two officers overlaps considerably, even though
the Chancellor handles far fewer cases than does the Ombudsman.
Analysis of the Chancellor's reports indicates that over a five-year
span he has annually docketed an average of 260 new cases based on
complaints or his own discoveries concerning the conduct of officials
also subject to the Ombudsman's supervision.
47. Instead of reporting to Parliament, the Chancellor of Justice makes a report
nominally to the King, in fact filed with the Ministry of Justice. The report Is a public
document and, as such, can be examined by the curious. But it is not printed for general
distribution.
48. They include appearing as counsel in civil cases in which the State Is defendant
(twenty-five to fifty annually), acting in the King's behalf on letters addressed to the
monarch by "supplicants" (of which there are only a few), exercising a somewhat vague
supervision of enrolled advocates (who are members of a self-governing organization that
renders usually final disciplinary judgments), giving advice concerning legal questions
to the King in Council (that is, the Cabinet or a Minister; roughly, two hundred such
matters annually), expressing opinions on legislative proposals before the Cabinet (a re-
sponsibility, or perhaps one should say an opportunity, he shares with many others),
and prosecuting publishers who have abused the privileges recognized by the Freedom
of the Press Act of 1949.
49. The Chancellor of Justice has said that when superior officers in one of the central
administrative boards have reason to call for an investigation of one of their subordinates,
they are more likely to turn to him than to the Ombudsman because, thanks to history,
he is a "part of the Government" while the Ombudsman is linked with Parliament.
50. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
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TAm.E IV. Chancellor of Justice Cases That Overlap Ombudsman's
New cases filed Decided Balance at years end
1960 235 230 69
1961 168 207 36
1962 264 220 80
1963 300 276 104
1964 335 338 101
The absence of friction or contrariety of results in the work of
these tvo important officials is a tribute to their personal flexibility
and the Swedish genius for reasoned discussion. Neither man is the
superior of the other; a person who has complained unsuccessfully to
one may with perfect propriety turn to his counterpart; no statute
prescribes coordination of inspections and investigations. In short,
all the preconditions of strife are present. Very occasionally the Chan-
cellor and the Ombudsman do disagree in their legal reasoning, thus
providing bemused administrators a choice of different guidelines.
They attempt, however, to minimize confusion by private discussions
over the lunch table several times weekly. The Chancellor of Justice
before initiating an investigation on his own motion is likely to tele-
phone the Ombudsman to inquire whether an investigation is al-
ready afoot. The two officials exchange notes concerning the "queru-
lants" who may write to both of them simultaneously.51 One stands
aside for the other when a prosecution is in the offing. And so they
rub along, officially wholly unrelated and yet in fact collaborators
holding equal rank in the governmental hierarchy, acting separately
as general superintendents of law administration.
The Militay Ombudsman. In 1915 the Ombudsman's work was
divided. A second parliamentary Ombudsman, to be chosen in the
same manner and with the same general powers as the Justitieombuds-
man, was created to deal with all matters pertaining to the military.
His jurisdiction extends not only to the conduct of the armed forces
themselves, but also to all officials whose salaries are paid out of mili-
tary appropriations, thus including defense procurement. Marking
off the boundaries of the new Ombudsman's duties in this way recog-
nizes that modern military activities are a central element of civilian
life and not merely the province of a small caste of professional sol-
51. The precise extent of duplication of complaints is not knowM, though the
Ombudsman and the Chancellor confirm that they have many clients in common, who
write to them simultaneously or successively. The Chancellor notes that chronically ag-
grieved persons file multiple complaints with him in the course of a year, so that the
individual complainants are substantially fewer than the complaints received.
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diers. The Ombudsman's absorption in civil administration was
thought to necessitate a separate officer to guard citizens against abuses
in military administration.
The Military Ombudsman (Militieombudsman) functions within
his sphere much as the Ombudsman does in his. The two officers are
mutually independent. They refer cases to one another when com-
plaints have been misdirected or when an investigation by one of
them discloses matters of interest to the other.
Most of the Military Ombudsman's business is an outgrowth of his
own inspections. Complaints usually provide only about twelve per
cent of his annual caseload of approximately 650, though during World
War II, when general mobilization affected a large part of the popula-
tion, complaints were much more numerous. Like the Ombudsman,
the Military Ombudsman can admonish a named person, make gen-
eral recommendations, or prosecute an official wrongdoer. The prose-
cutions are, in the main, for matters that in the United States would
probably not be deemed suitable for the criminal courts at all, but
rather for some form of administrative discipline-an official con-
nected with defense industries who had been careless in handling
secret documents, a commissioned officer who had insulted a non-
commissioned officer, a commander who had punished draftees for
having been drunk at a time when they were off duty and not on
military premises, and so on.
Together the Military Ombudsman and his colleague on the civil
side are supposed to cover the entire area of Swedish public adminis-
tration. Of the two the Ombudsman has been far the more active. The
two officers are not in conflict, since the dividing line between their
respective jurisdictions is clear and neither has sought to expand his
empire by encroaching upon the other. Because, very occasionally, prob-
lems of classifying complaints may arise or the two offices may confront
common questions of statutory interpretation, the Ombudsmen con-
fer together informally and irregularly. Additional coordination of
their activities has thus far not seemed necessary.
The Public Prosecutors. In a strictly technical sense, the Ombuds-
man is only a public prosecutor. Other prosecutors are supposed to
enforce penal laws within a defined geographical area. The Ombuds-
man is supposed to enforce them within a defined occupational area,
namely, the public service.
Actually, even within that relatively narrow area, he does a far
smaller share of the work than is commonly known. The prosecutors
have not been freed from responsibility for making other officials toe
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the mark. They have been superseded by the Ombudsman and the
Chancellor of Justice as prosecutors of judges and of very high offi-
cials. But as to the generality of Swedish public servants, the local
prosecutors have the same power as the Ombudsman to prosecute for
ignorance, carelessness, bad manners, and slothfulness as well as for
more serious venality. The Ombudsman may initiate a half dozen
prosecutions in the course of a year,52 and the Chancellor of Justice
and the Military Ombudsman may commence another eight or nine.
Not all result in convictions. According to available judicial statistics,
however, courts of first instance in 1961 convicted 125 civil servants
of having committed crimes in their official capacities.53 The figure was
129 in 1962 and 107 in 1963.54 These totals show beyond doubt that
less exalted prosecutors have independently brought to the courts many
cases of the types with which Ombudsmen deal.
In theory a public prosecutor can only prosecute. He supposedly
cannot content himself with scolding or advising as do the Ombuds-
man and the Chancellor. One distinguished scholar asserts flatly that
Ombudsmen are different from other law enforcement officials chiefly
because "unlike the public prosecutors, they are not subjected to a
legality principle in the sense of being obliged to prosecute when
they consider that a breach of duty has been committed."rj In reality,
public prosecutors do not choose to prosecute every case, any more
than do the other guardians of official rectitude. In the great bulk
of cases reported to them by irate citizens in the local community, the
prosecutor does exactly what the Ombudsman does when he thinks
that a "reminder" will accomplish as much as a more formal punish-
ment. Some prosecutors freely acknowledge using the telephone more
frequently than the criminal courts to correct what they regard as
administrative improprieties. Statistical evidence strongly supports the
view that obligatory prosecution is not a "legality principle" or, if it
is one, that it weighs only lightly on practical men. In 1961 the Swedish
52. See Table I supra.
53. Of these, only four were for conduct such as bribery or embezzlement that would
constitute a serious crime in all countries. The remainder were for relatively minor acts
of omission or commission, usually under the heading of "breach of duty." Twenty.two
acquittals occurred.
54. The convictions usually led only to imposition of fines. The courts did, however,
order the dismissal or suspension of 16 officials in 1961, 13 officials in 1962. and 17 offi-
dais in 1963. An undetermined number of these removals from office seem to have been
related to misconduct unconnected with official activities. The materials available in the
Central Bureau of Statistics are not altogether clear in this respect.
55. S. Jagersli6ld, The Swedish Constitution: A Survey, 5 J. IN DIAN L. sr. 1, 13
(1963).
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police investigated 1079 alleged crimes by civil servants and concluded
that accusations were well founded in 519 of these cases. In 1962, 1208
investigations produced evidence of offenses in 666 cases. Prosecutors
control and guide police much more closely in Sweden than in the
United States (in many places, indeed, the chief of police and the
prosecutor were one and the same person until a statutory change
occurred in 1965). Hence, one may fairly conclude that prosecutions
were technically justifiable in virtually all the cases the police had
reported. Since prosecutions were in fact commenced in only a minor
fraction of those cases and since prosecutors do not habitually dis-
regard police reports, one must conclude that other less drastic steps
were taken instead. A confident assertion to this effect is impossible
because the Supreme Prosecutor of Sweden recently stated that prose-
cutors must only prosecute, not admonish. If they believe that prose-
cution would be too drastic a measure, they have been explicitly in-
structed to refer the matter to the Supreme Prosecutor. He recalls
receiving only about ten such referrals each year. Harmonizing the
statements of the Supreme Prosecutor and his subordinates is beyond
the capacities of a foreign interviewer.
Conflict between the Ombudsman and other prosecutors is rare.
If a local prosecutor already has in hand a matter about which com-
plaint has also been made to the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman de-
fers to the prosecutor. Prosecutors, for their part, do not eagerly seek
means of tweaking the Ombudsman's nose; they are not organization-
ally subordinate to him, but, like other officials, they are subject to
his scrutiny. When a prosecution has been ordered by the Ombuds-
man (who rarely prosecutes personally), the order is obeyed without
debate.56 The public prosecutors, collectively, receive and act upon
about as many complaints against civil servants as does the Ombuds-
man. As far as a foreign interviewer can discover, no atmosphere of
rivalry or competition (or, one is tempted to add, even awareness that
many cooks are engaged in stirring the same broth) has developed
in any quarter. T
56. If a prosecutor were to reject a case the Ombudsman deemed clearly prosecutable,
the Ombudsman could, in fact, prosecute the prosecutor for breach of duty. That type
of clash seems never to have arisen.
57. One prosecutor did express uneasiness about dropping a case without prosecution
when a breach of duty has been found. "I can't believe that prosecution is the sensible
step in every instance," he declared. "The other day a man very angrily complained right
at this desk about having been treated offensively by a clerk in the post office, I called
up the clerk's superior and he promised to speak to the clerk about it, warn him to
watch his step in the future. That is all I did. I think it was the best way to handle the
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THE OM ,BUDSAuN'S RELATIONS WITH THE COURTS
The Ombudsman's power over the courts is especially interesting
to Americans, who think of judicial independence as the very foun-
dation of the rule of law and who tend to equate judges' "indepen-
dence" with their being unsupervised except by other judges. The
Ombudsman acknowledges that foreigners often wonder whether his
work undermines the independence judges should have. But he has
no fears on that score. "I myself come from the ranks of judges," he
has written, "and can assure that I have never heard a Swedish judge
complain that his independent and unattached position is endangered
by the fact that the [Ombudsman] may examine his activity in office."
Many judges of all ranks and of different degrees of experience,
when interviewed in 1964, confirmed that the judiciary does not feel
imperiled. One judge of long service, possibly more philosophic than
his brethren, commented: "We have grown up in this system. None
of us has ever known any other. We are used to the idea back of the
Ombudsman. If we had been encountering it for the first time, per-
haps it would have made us uncomfortable. But as things stand, I
doubt that any Swedish judge feels any loss of independence when
the Ombudsman looks at what he has been doing."
Abstractly, the Ombudsman is not concerned with the content of
courts' decisions (which, in any event, he cannot revise in any way),
but only with the question of whether a judge has been acting il-
legally. Since illegality, in the Swedish view, covers so extensive a ter-
ritory, consideration of the judge's decisions may be an inescapable
necessity. To suggest the most extreme possibility along this line,
the Ombudsman could even prosecute for the crime of breach of duty
judges who had rejected his views in prosecutions commenced at his
behest. He could not disregard the decisions he opposed, but he could
proceed against the deciders. This has in fact never occurred. So far
as one can tell, judges have not the slightest worry that it ever will
occur. Even so, part of the Ombudsman's work does involve review
of the judges' decisions, not only their conduct.
The distinction can be made plainer by illustration. Poor judgment
rather than poor judging was involved when, a few years ago, an ap-
thing, though I daresay the clerk was guilty of an offense. But now, if the complainant
still wants to make an issue of it, he can go to the Ombudsman and complain not
against the clerk but against me for not doing my duty as a prosecutor. Well, I don't
much like that possibility. I am having to gamble, you see, that nobody will complain
or that, if someone does, the Ombudsman will agree with my informal approach. If I
just went ahead and prosecuted every case, nobody could say a word against me."
1965]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
pellate judge was found guilty of having accepted compensation to
help a lawyer prepare documents for use in litigation. The judge was
not himself related to the litigation and no corruption of justice en-
tered into the case, but the defendant was simply accused of improper
behavior in acting as a lawyer's assistant. The Supreme Court before
which his trial occurred convicted him and imposed a heavy fine. At
about the same time three trial court judges were successfully prose-
cuted because they had heard and decided a forfeiture case, an in rem
action, without first giving an interested person the prescribed formal
notice. The judges had thought that formalities could be waived be-
cause the interested person's legal representative was actually present
in the court when the case was heard. In this instance, in contrast
to the example previously discussed, the Ombudsman was acting as
a critic of judicial work rather than of a judge's personal behavior."8
Cases like this do indeed cause a few judges to speak rather waspishly
about the Ombudsman, whom they regard as sometimes a shade too
censorious and self-righteous. On several occasions in widely scattered
localities judges recounted with pleasure that the Ombudsman had
had to eat humble pie at least once. Acting upon a private complaint
during his first month in office, the Ombudsman had said that a court
official had improperly attached the complainant's property in order
to secure the payment of personal taxes. In accord with the Ombuds-
man's advice the impounded property was returned to its owner.
Later, a Supreme Court judge convinced the Ombudsman that lie
had misinterpreted the applicable statute. Meanwhile, the tax debtor
had dissipated the previously attached property and had been unable
to pay his taxes in full, so that the public treasury was the loser. The
Ombudsman bravely acknowledged his own error by reporting it to
Parliament and, at the same time, paid out of his personal funds the
amount of the lost revenue. This episode, not at all discreditable in
58. The judges' decision on the merits of the forfeiture case, incidentally, was affirmed
on appeal. Moreover, the person from whom the required notice had been withheld did
not recover the property in controversy, nor were any damages awarded in the proceeding
against the judges. The judges were, however, fined approximately half a month's salary.
One of them still becomes almost explosively red in the face when discussing the matter.
He thinks, moreover, that his work in the community was made more difficult for a
time by reason of his having been convicted as a malefactor, though the difficulty was
not long-lived because, as he said, the public had no choice in the matter. He also thinks
that press publicity about complaints to the Ombudsman against a judge tend to be
harmful to judicial administration even after the judge has been exonerated, because
the newspapers (he says) "blow up the charges out of all proportion." Despite all this,




itself, has gained currency among judges, as though they welcomed the
reassurance that the Ombudsman can err just as they do.
Most judges, however, seem genuinely enthusiastic about the Om-
budsman, whom they regard as an able jurist and a good human being.
No judge who was interviewed in 1964 suggested that the present
system of supervision should be abandoned.
APPRAISING THE O IBUDSMAN'S WORK
The Ombudsman has in recent years been so rapturously regarded
abroad that his achievements have not often been evaluated. What
he is supposed to accomplish is taken as the equivalent of what he has
in fact accomplished. The following paragraphs attempt to appraise
rather than merely describe. The underlying observations were per-
force incomplete; scientific accuracy is not claimed.
Securing Uniformity in Law Interpretation. The doctrine of stare
decisis does not compel lower courts in Sweden to follow the lead
of the higher courts. This intensifies the risk, present in all legal sys-
tems, that principles and statutes may not be applied harmoniously
throughout the country. This possibility becomes still greater when
courts and other tribunals fail to write fully explanatory opinions
tightly related to the facts of the cases under discussion.
One of the Ombudsman's important accomplishments is achieving
uniformity. He does so by expressing his own opinion so persuasively
that courts and administrators voluntarily follow his lead. Indeed, un-
til the Ombudsman has sought to resolve differences, many judges
and administrators have been unaware that the differences had oc-
curred; they have not consciously disagreed with other authorities,
but have been ignorant of their views.
The Ombudsman has remarked on many occasions that differing
applications of a single rule of law do not necessarily connote illegal-
ity; all of the interpretations may be defensible though some must be
deemed incorrect. When the Ombudsman becomes aware that various
authorities have been applying a law in different ways, he may first
ask many agencies or individual officials to explain to him their in-
terpretation of the statute or rule. Then he may make an indepen-
dent study of the pertinent legislative history. Finally, usually by set-
ting forth his opinion in his annual report, he will present his own
view of the law. His opinion, though assuredly not more binding than
an opinion of the Supreme Court of Sweden, is highly persuasive. It
brings home to scattered administrators the carefully considered
thoughts of a respected jurist who has made a nationwide survey of
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
present practices, and most law appliers seem to welcome what he can
tell them. 59
Some scholars have contended that the Ombudsman should not
function as an oracle, but only as a prosecutor in pursuit of officials
who have done wrong. They point out that his pronouncements about
law may ultimately be rejected by courts. This, they say, may accentu-
ate confusion, which could be avoided if the Ombudsman were to
remain silent except when he is ready to prosecute. The Ombudsman
has answered that interpretation of the law is often a necessary first
step toward ascertaining whether a judge or civil servant has acted
wrongly. Having made his interpretation, he sees no reason to keep
it a secret from those who might be helped by knowing it. And so he
publishes his views even when he has found no breach of duty.
The Ombudsman's 1962 report shows several good examples of this
practice, clustering about the seizure of defendant's property in con-
nection with litigation. Property may be sequestered for use in evi-
dence (for example, a negotiable instrument alleged to be illegally
possessed) or as security for the payment of damages and costs. Having
reviewed the report of a commission upon whose recommendation
certain changes in procedural law had been enacted, the Ombudsman
concluded that several judges had been acting mistakenly in sequestra-
tion matters, though not in circumstances warranting prosecution. In
all the specific cases that had led to his examining the general problem,
the Ombudsman noted, the judges had now discarded their original
interpretations and had said that they would in future adopt his.
Officials in many parts of Sweden spoke warmly of what they char-
acterized as the "service" the Ombudsman has rendered them by thus
clarifying difficult legal issues. A local police administrator, for ex-
ample, declared: "The new law of criminal procedure when it came
into force a few years ago was less clear, we thought, than statutes
usually are. It caused us a lot of difficulty, and I think we would be
in it still if the Ombudsman hadn't given us some standards we could
apply in connection with seizure and arrest. The law prescribes time
limits for various actions, and the police and the prosecutors were
59. Compare J~igerski6ld, op. cit. supra note 29, at 1092-93: Although the Ombudsman's
interpretations "are not legally binding on courts or administrators, and it is generally
realized that they may be erroneous and that a court may disavow them, a certain pre-
sumption exists that these interpretations are correct. The annual reports of the Ombuds.
man are carefully studied as evidence of the law. Thus, although it is not In Itself a
fault to act contrary to those opinions, it is nevertheless true that if an official can show
that he has acted in accordance with such a statement by the Ombudsman, he has a
considerable chance of being absolved from blame."
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terribly confused about how to measure the limits. In fact, there were
nearly as many opinions about the implications of those rules as there
were police officers and prosecutors. Then the Ombudsman sent out
his interpretations and did a lot to create a common practice all over
the country."
The other side of the coin is, obviously enough, that the Ombuds-
man's legal analysis may sometimes be faulty. He works on many mat-
ters, aided by only a small staff. Even the ablest lawyer makes mis-
takes. A Stockholm prosecutor, one of the few outspoken critics of the
present Ombudsman system, calls the Ombudsman's pronouncements
"a sort of one-man lawgiving that is anachronistic in the twentieth
century. It may have been all right in the seventeenth century. But
who in modem times would think of creating a high court with only
one member? Every appellate court reflects mankind's experience
that two heads are wiser than one. Only in the case of the Ombuds-
man does it miraculously occur that one head is wiser than many."
The Generalist in a Specialized World. The possibility of error in-
creases when a person whose training and experience are entirely in
the law is called upon to be a compendium of governmental wisdom,
as is the Ombudsman. Many of the earlier Ombudsmen concentrated
upon courts and court-related activities. During the first one hundred
years of the office, according to its present occupant, 71.4 per cent of
the prosecutions commenced by Ombudsmen were directed against
judges, prosecutors, and police. As recently as 1951 the then Ombuds-
man issued 140 admonitions to those groups and only 33 to all other
(and far more numerous) governmental personnel.6 0 The growth of
important law administration outside the courts made this distribu-
tion of the Ombudsman's attention seem glaringly inappropriate. Re-
sponding to urging by Parliament and by scholars, the present Om-
budsman has striven mightily to cover the entire field of government.
One does not gain the impression that the Ombudsman ascribes to
himself an all-encompassing wisdom. He does not, however, limit him-
self to legal questions. He feels free to offer suggestions looking toward
administrative improvement.6' Often those suggestions, the product of
60. These figures are derived from G. Petr~n, Justilicombudsmannens uppsiht ovcr
f4rvaltningen, [1953] F6RvALTNINGsRATnG Tmsr uTr 79, 8687, cited and quoted in Ander-
man, op. cit. supra note 29, at 236.
61. For example, he recently rejected a complaint against a prison administrator who
had disciplined a prisoner for disobeying a valid prison regulation. At the same time,
noting that the prisoner was a Finn and that the prison population included other Finns
who could not read Swedish, the Ombudsman suggested that the prison regulations be
printed in a Finnish translation in order to avoid future misunderstandings.
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a fresh look by an intelligent eye, gain immediate and deserved ac-
ceptance.62 Sometimes they lead to a negotiated settlement when the
administrators find the Ombudsman's initial proposals unacceptable,
but nevertheless concede that changes of some sort should be made.0
Still, "common sense" does not solve every problem. Government
becomes increasingly complex and specialized year by year, respond-
ing as it must to the complications and specializations of human af-
fairs. The Ombudsman, no matter how intelligent and diligent, can-
not be expected to grasp all the implications of every branch of civil
administration. While respecting him personally and giving him credit
for a high measure of success, officials do at times remark that the
Ombudsman "just did not understand our problem."0 4
Whether or not that rather soft impeachment is sustainable, the
Ombudsman does indeed seek to be a sort of social statesman in many
fields that specialists find full of perplexities. His 1964 report deals,
among other things, with detention of children under eighteen pend-
ing trial on delinquency charges, psychiatric examinations, provision
of police protection for persons who have received threats of violence,
62. For example, in 1964 he proposed to a national inspection agency that It tighten
its rules for protecting employees who complained to it concerning improper working
conditions. The question arose when a young hairdresser was discharged after her em-
ployer had read a letter which her father had written to the Inspection agency concerning
his daughter's work place. While Swedish law concerning public access to official files
had to be taken into account, the Ombudsman thought that additional safeguards could
be devised for the future. The inspection agency agreed.
63. A few years ago a prisoner complained that the prison governor had forbidden
his subscribing to a certain weekly magazine. The governor, who had legal power to
restrict prisoners' privileges in order to maintain prison security, explained that this
magazine caused unrest among prisoners by sometimes printing articles about prison
conditions. He was upheld by the National Prison Board. The Ombudsman then ques.
tioned whether the prohibitory rule was valid, pointing out that other prison governors
had not deemed it necessary. Finally, the Board proposed that prisoners should be al-
lowed to have the magazine in question unless the governor were to find a particular Issue
to be dangerous, in which case he could restrict distribution of that specific issue. This
compromise satisfied the Ombudsman and the prison governor. A high official of tile
National Prison Board referred to this episode as one that "shows we do not ignore tile
Ombudsman's word even when we disagree with it. His view has great weight. Mo3tly
we think his judgment is very good. He tells us in advance about the 'possibility' of his
decision and we have a chance to comment before a final decision is made, and some-
times we work out a decision that seems to us a bit better than the 'possibility.'"
64. Some examples, plucked from interviews and without any representation that the
criticism of the Ombudsman is in each instance justified: (1) Ombudsman reprimanded
school authorities for giving a "bad conduct mark" to a student newspaper editor who
had printed an article not approved by the faculty adviser, saying that this was Infringe-
ment of freedom of the press; some educators think that the Ombudsman fails to grasp the
difference between irresponsible adolescents within an educational framework and more
mature journalists in the great world. (2) An apparently drunken man was picked up
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and creation of medical facilities other than hospitals to which police
and other officials may speedily refer acutely ill persons for diagnosis
and emergency treatment. Other recent reports have discussed such
diverse matters as custody of children of persons divorced by agree-
ment, provision of needed legal services for impecunious or ignorant
defendants, and revocation of automobile drivers' licenses. An outside
observer cannot escape wondering whether a general practitioner
should be expected to cope with so broad a range of ills, without the
aid of more elaborate technical resources than the Ombudsman can
command.
Attentiveness to the Ombudsman's Recommendations. Earlier sec-
tions of this paper have commented upon the judicial and adminis-
trative response to the Ombudsman's "reminders." The more specific
his recommendations are-the more, that is, they are tied to the facts
of particular episodes-the more likely they will be accepted and
acted upon. When he makes general proposals of statutory change or
large-scale administrative revision, his suggestions receive respectful
consideration, but they are not at all assured of being adopted.
In the past the Ombudsman addressed his legislative proposals di-
rectly to Parliament through his annual report. At present he usually
sends them first to the Cabinet or to a particular minister, and then
by the police and put in a cell to "sleep it off." Relatives clamored for his release, saying
that he was ill, not drunk. The police, who had heard that tale before, were unmoved.
Soon afterward the man died in a hospital, to which he had been taken tardily. Autopsy
showed the cause of death to have been the illness of which his relatives had spoken.
The Ombudsman did not criticize what the police had done, but urged that, in future, the
chief of police should be personally called when apparently serious drunkenness prob-
lems occurred, so that he could decide whether special measures should be taken. Said
the head of the police force in a large city: "If the Ombudsman's advice were followed,
I would never have a night's sleep. It's a fine idea, but it won't work." (3) A customs
officer was prosecuted at the Ombudsman's behest because he had "covered up" for an
informant who, under a pledge of secrecy, had given a tip that led to a smuggler's being
apprehended and convicted. In the smuggler's trial and in official documents the customs
officer had, in effect, represented that the detection of the smuggler had come about
through official activity alone. The Ombudsman prosecuted for breach of duty. Said one
official: "If we are not to be able to use tips from informers-and we certainly won't
have many tips if we cannot protect our sources-this job will become pretty nearly
hopeless. If the Ombudsman had to catch smugglers instead of officers, he would under-
stand that" In the last cited example, the court before which the customs officer had
been tried said that the defendant had "behaved incorrectly," but, bccaufe of the pres-
sure of events that had influenced his behavior, he could not be held guilty of breach
of duty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the acquittal. The Ombudsman did not appeal
further, saying that appeal to the Supreme Court should be undertaken "only where
important questions of principle are at stake. The courts have confirmed that [the cus-
toms officer] handled the matter incorrectly. There is, therefore, no need to review the
decision of the Court of Appeal." 1964 REPoRT oF ThE 0smunsA 15.
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later informs Parliament of what he has done. Some sticklers for the
niceties of parliamentary organization criticize this on the ground
that the Ombudsman is an agent of the Parliament and not of the
Government. But the Ombudsman's practice does seem to secure
quicker and surer attention to his ideas than if he simply dropped
them into Parliament's lap.
Even when instant acceptance does not occur, the Ombudsman's
proposals may give direction to later events. He has, for example, long
urged that administrators should be required to give reasons for their
decisions, and he has often developed the theme of due administrative
procedure. 5 In doing so, he followed a path previously marked by
a distinguished Swedish authority on administrative law, Professor
Nils Herlitz. At first the Ombudsman's recommendations were quietly
ignored, perhaps chiefly because administrative agencies advised they
were impracticable. Undaunted, the Ombudsman patiently repeated
his advice, which gained support in many private quarters. In 1964,
after years of work, an official commission, appointed by the Ministry
of Justice (on Professor Herlitz's suggestion) to study the desirability
of an administrative procedure act, submitted a report embodying
many of the principles the Ombudsman had urged. If a statute finally
emerges from all this, it will not properly be attributed to the Om-
budsman (who, indeed, would not himself claim credit), but it will
at least perhaps have been hastened by him.
In the sphere of governmental activity, the Ombudsman may be
said to resemble a law revision commission charged with noticing the
need for changes in laws that do not constantly interest pressure
groups, political parties, or the press. Earlier Ombudsmen's efforts to
humanize Sweden's prisons furnish a notable example. As recently as
a dozen years ago a need was perceived for additional statutes that
would bring scattered institutions within the reach of uniform rules.
Statutory improvement of various aspects of judicial organization and
administration may also be ascribed to suggestions by Ombudsmen.
65. In 1964, for instance, he pointed out the desirability of higher authorities' giving
opportunity for comment on decisions by lower administrative authorities. A person seek.
ing permission to purchase farm land, as required by the Land Acquisition Act of 1955,
has three chances to succeed, first by asking a local farm committee for the permit, then
by appealing to the Agricultural Board from an adverse decision, and finally by asking
the King in Council (realistically, the Minister of Agriculture) to revicw unfavorable
action by the Agricultural Board. But, unless he makes a special effort to see the file
containing a decision adverse to him, he is not apprised of the grounds upon which his
application has been denied. The Ombudsman proposed that in the future an adverse
decision should be fully communicated to an applicant, whose exceptions to It should bc
received and considered by the next higher level of authority.
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Without minimizing the Ombudsmen's good works as law reform-
ers, one must nevertheless conclude that their annual reports have
been extremely minor forces in shaping Sweden's legislation. "Parlia-
ment does not sit up and take notice whenever the Ombudsman has
an idea about statutes," said one veteran member, "nor does the Gov-
ernment. The ministries think they know what's what without his
telling them." "That is perfectly true," another member of Parliament
agreed, "but I would add that if the Government doesn't pay any
particular attention to his ideas, somebody in the Opposition is almost
sure to do so. That at least keeps the idea alive. Sometimes a sugges-
tion the Ombudsman initiates might lead, much later, to a motion in
Parliament that brings results. Taking a broad look at the matter,
though, I would have to say that the Ombudsmen have been better
suited to applying existing law than to persuading Parliament to en-
act new law."
Unfairness to Officials. As has been described elsewhere in this paper,
the Ombudsman has in late years initiated few prosecutions. Instead
he has admonished officials who, in his opinion, have made mistakes.
His annual reports, as well as the materials regularly available to the
newspapers, identify the errant officials and explain why they have been
censured. This practice, while seemingly milder than prosecution, has
been strongly criticized. Civil servants, a well known writer has said,
may have to "stand ... in the pillory not only for grave faults but also
for minor lapses which are in fact more or less excusable--an example
will be made of them in order to show how administrative work should
be carried on."'6 6 Since those in the pillory have not been tried and
found guilty, the soundness of the Ombudsman's strictures has not
been judicially tested. Some officials, noting that the Ombudsman's
prosecutions are far from uniformly successful, suggest that his judg-
ment may be equally fallible when he "gives a reminder." They ques-
tion whether he should castigate an official whom he has found no
cause to prosecute; they think he should keep condemnatory opinions
to himself, except in so far as they may be formulated so generally as
not to bring shame to a named individual. 7
The Ombudsman shrugs off these objections. His instructions from
Parliament, he has observed, tell him to prosecute iniquitous, grossly
negligent, and dangerous official behavior, not every picayune fault he
66. N. Herlitz, Swedish Administrative Law: Some Characteristic Features, 3 Sc.'iD.
Siut. iN LAw 89, 124 (1959).
67. For an especially well balanced presentation of this point of view, see J5gcr kirld,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 1088-91.-
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may detect. The courts, moreover, will convict only when an official's
mistake has been so blatant as to warrant imposition of punishment;
so the Ombudsman thinks prosecution is a waste of everybody's time
when in his own estimation punishment would be inappropriate even
though an impropriety has occurred. Further, he says, an official ag-
grieved by the Ombudsman's treatment of him is always at liberty to
complain to Parliament and to seek redress there.08 Finally, the Om-
budsman remarks that anyone who is outraged by having been casti-
gated has only to say so-in which case the Ombudsman will "co-
operate" by prosecuting instead of simply criticizing.00
In truth, the fault lies with Swedish law rather than with the Om-
budsman. Neither the Ombudsman nor a disagreeing official can go to
court to resolve differences of opinion, except in the unwieldy and
unwelcome form of a prosecution for crime. Many official acts may be
wrong without being criminal, just as the judgments of lower courts
are often wrong (at least in the eyes of appellate courts) though ren-
dered in the utmost good faith. The Ombudsman's effectiveness would
be greatly diminished were he forced to remain silent about non-
criminal wrongs. On the other hand, methods might well be sought to
permit access to the courts in those instances when a conscientious
official thinks the Ombudsman has erred.
One assuredly unintended consequence of the present system, with
its harsh choice between prosecution and denunciation, is that it
accentuates the timidity of some public servants. While official excesses
must be guarded against, modern Sweden, like all other modern
countries, needs a great deal of official enthusiasm, vigilance, and
devotion. If it were ever true that that government is best which
68. This has occurred in a very few instances, never (so far as anyone can recall) with
any response by Parliament, though perhaps the Ombudsman may have been asked
questions in private. The Ombudsman's independence from parliamentary pressures Is
rather scrupulously maintained.
69. 1964 REPORT OF THE OMBUDSMAN 115, discloses an cxample of this readiness. A
prosecutor had promised a witness immunity from prosecution for tax evasion In order
to induce him to testify concerning a fraudulent transaction from which he had profited.
The defendant's lawyer questioned the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct. After con-
sulting the Bar Association and the Supreme Prosecutor, the Ombudsman announced
that the prosecutor, whom he named, had behaved wrongly, motivated by zeal rather
than wickedness. Shortly afterward the prosecutor, in an article in a legal periodical,
defended what he had done. The Ombudsman, remarking that the author's dissenting
opinion perhaps suggested an intent to resume the practice the Ombudsman had found
to be objectionable, asked whether the prosecutor would like to be prosecuted so that
the courts could pass on the matter. Given a week to think about this generous offer,
the prosecutor finally decided that perhaps it would be best to drop the argument then
and there. For further discussion, see Lundvik, op. cit. supra note 14, at 46-48.
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governs least, nobody believes this to be sound doctrine today. A civil
servant of highest rank and great experience, particularly in provincial
administration, remarked in relation to the Ombudsman's fault-find-
ing: "My observation over the years has been that the men who are
trying hardest to get things done are the ones most likely to be
criticized. We have suggested that the Ombudsman should look at a
man's whole record before prosecuting or denouncing him, because that
would give some basis for saying whether or not he really is a bad
actor. But the Ombudsman says this is none of his business; he is in-
terested only in the act, not the actor. The upshot of that is that
officials who want to be sure not to get into trouble don't try to find
the quickest and simplest ways to do their jobs, but the safest. I have
rarely heard of anyone's being held up before the public as a horrible
example because he was not being vigorous enough. Nowadays the
civil service needs vigor, but it isn't really encouraged to have it."
A police chief, whose general attitude toward the Ombudsman was
markedly favorable, asserted that the Ombudsman's naming policemen
who had made non-criminal mistakes was unfair to them and socially
unsound as well. "A policeman has to act on the spur of the moment,"
he said. "Of course if you are sitting at a table afterward, with plenty
of time to look at the laws and regulations, you may be able to show
that he didn't do things correctly in some respect. But the policeman
didn't have a chance to make a long study; he had to react quickly.
I heartily agree that the Ombudsman ought to be constantly in every
policeman's mind, a part of his conscience. But I don't think that the
policeman ought to feel that a heavy hand is always about to fall on
him. I'm afraid that that is what is happening. Sometimes policemen
are not doing their whole duty, not because of laziness or bad dis-
cipline or anything like that, but simply because they are playing it
safe."
A lesser police official in another city repeated this thought, com-
menting that he had heard fellow officers say explicitly that they had
not taken steps they thought appropriate because they were unsure
about the Ombudsman's views. "None of those fellows worries about
being punished for doing too little," he added, "but he knows he can
get into plenty of trouble for doing too much."
A prison administrator remarked that many prisoners had been
badly disturbed a few nights previously by the shouts of a fellow-
prisoner who had been denied a further dosage of sleeping pills;
"when, next morning, I asked the guard who had been on duty why
he had not tried to make the fellow shut up, he said, 'why should I put
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my neck on the block? He is just the kind who would complain, and
then I would be the one who had to defend myself.'"
The chairman of a municipal agency dealing with problems of
alcoholism pointed to what he said had been a widely publicized criti-
cism of a similar agency in a nearby community as an example of the
Ombudsman's value. Then, almost as an afterthought, he remarked,
"That criticism caused me a lot of trouble, though. My own committee
became so cautious I had difficulty getting anything at all done, even
the good things that needed doing very badly. The Ombudsman is
necessary, but he also slows down the pace of our work. It is awfully
hard to find the right balance."
The Burgomaster (a judge) of another city agreed that finding the
right balance is indeed difficult. He put the matter this way: "The
Ombudsman inhibits action by civil servants in much the same way
as statutes influence citizens in general. Some citizens go right up to
the line of permissibility that a statute has drawn. Others hang back,
stopping far short of the line rather than run the risk of going across
it. That is the way with officials. Some of them won't take a chance of
getting into trouble and so they don't do things they probably could
do-and should do-without being criticized."
Since the subtle motivations of human behavior are difficult to
ascertain individually, let alone en masse, these characterizations of
official attitudes have not been scientifically verified. An effort was
made, however, to ascertain whether the Ombudsman's admonitions
have enough impact on the individual's career to justify regarding the
admonitions with fear and trembling. Extensive inquiries lead to the
conclusion that the Ombudsman's finding fault causes some temporary
pain and perhaps some loss of self-esteem in most instances, but that it
rarely leaves permanent scars if the offense was not willful.
The same high official who had suggested that the Ombudsman dis-
couraged vigor in civil servants also remarked: "Most of my friends
who have risen to the top jobs have been prosecuted at one time or
another. With us," he said with a chuckle, "it is a kind of family
joke." The head of a metropolitan police department, himself a lawyer
like most Swedish police administrators, first noted that no policeman
had been prosecuted for a serious fault during at least the past eighteen
years, and then went on: "The press keeps such a close eye on us that
a headline saying the Ombudsman has criticized the police is almost
the equivalent of a prosecution. A criticism by me doesn't impress my
subordinates nearly as much as one by the Ombudsman." But, he
added, "when it comes to making promotions and assignments, I rely
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on my judgment, not the Ombudsman's, and I don't automatically
lower a man's standing because the Ombudsman found fault with
him." That kind of statement was made by a number of other high-
ranking officials, including a provincial prosecutor, who asserted: "I
would put it this way. A man who has been prosecuted or criticized
by the Ombudsman is hurt in his public image, but not in his profes-
sional image. He might feel a bit awkward at the Rotary Club lunches
for a few weeks perhaps, but his future career would not be affected."
Be that as it may, judges and civil servants talk much and freely
about the hurtfulness of being included in the Ombudsman's list.
Whether or not the hurt is as real as they believe it to be, their feelings
about it seem to be genuine.
The Ombudsman as a Protector. The Ombudsman serves impor-
tantly as a protector of the innocent as well as a smiter of the wicked.
By finding no fault in ninety per cent of the cases about which com-
plaint has been made, he sets at rest what might otherwise be contin-
uing rumors of wrongdoing. He may even be an insulator against the
heat a hostile press has engendered.70 His rulings serve to chart
paths that can be followed safely in the future. When he identifies
inadequate staffing as a cause of undesirable delays for which hard-
working officials have been unjustly blamed, he may help achieve
needed organizational reforms; as a court president said, "Advice from
outside often succeeds after we judges have failed to get what is
needed." And sometimes, especially in his reports of inspections, the
Ombudsman gives praise that does much for public servants' morale.
Ungenerously compensated for work of social import, civil servants
in every country often hear themselves denounced and only rarely
lauded. That is not the greatest possible inducement to take up a
career of public service. While the Ombudsman system is designed
70. In 1963 a child was atrociously murdered in Stockholm by a "sex maniac." Tie
murderer killed again in similar circumstances before he was apprehended. The police
were severely and frequently criticized in letters printed in the newspapers. Then the
police master requested the Ombudsman to ascertain whether the police had been negli-
gent or otherwise censurable. The newspapers, apprised of this, immediately ceased their
agitation, leaving the police department in peace while the Ombudsman looked into
the matter.
More than a year later the Ombudsman issued a 120-page report. He did find de-
ficiencies in the organization of the detective work at the time and he criticized several
police officers by name for not having adequately reported information they had re-
ceived; their pieces might have fitted into a whole so that the main outlines of the picture
could have been perceived more quickly by their superiors. But no cause for prosecution
or further action was found, nor were any general recommendations made since the
police department had already taken steps to improve its efficiency.
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primarily to mete out blame rather than to give credit where credit
is due, deserved protection and, occasionally, applause for the public's
employees are desirable by-products of the Ombudsman's activities.
CIRCULATION OF THE OMBUDSMAN'S VIEWS
The theory underlying much of the Ombudsman's work, especially
when he admonishes and instructs, is that his views will be known
generally within all ranks of officialdom. He prepares his opinions, as
he has said, not in a peremptory way, but with fully stated reasoning.
This, he expects, will not only inform the person whose fault he has
disclosed, but also other officials, thus "preventing a repetition of the
faulty procedure. In this manner, knowledge of the substantive law
is disseminated due to the fact that all important decisions [by the
Ombudsman] are accounted for in the annual reports. Most officials
read the reports, at least as regards their own administrative field."'7
While the Ombudsman's annual report does indeed have an extraor-
dinarily large readership, most officials do not in fact ever see it,
let alone read it. The report is printed at present in an edition of only
3400 copies. Many of these go to Parliament, scholars, libraries in
Sweden and abroad, journalists, and others who are not in the public
service. About 2000 copies are sent directly by the Ombudsman's office
to judges and administrators. When one recalls that Sweden employs
approximately five hundred judges in active judicial service, with two
or three hundred others on temporary detail to special commissions,
ministries, and the like; some hundreds of prosecutors; and nearly
200,000 civil servants, one must conclude that access to the annual
report is not easily had by all.
This conclusion is readily confirmed by direct observations, of which
the following are a random sampling: the report does not reach a
regional administrator of social insurance, a provincial agricultural
director, the acknowledged head (though not the ceremonial head) of
a sizeable city administration, police officers in general, local temper-
ance and child welfare committees; many courts with plural judges
receive one copy of the report; each provincial government receives
six copies for the use of all its officials in all of its branches; in some
offices in which the reports for the current and past years are displayed
on bookshelves, they are in such unsullied condition that they have
clearly never been passed from hand to hand. Furthermore, the reports
had not been indexed for the past fifty years until, in 1965, an index
71. A. Bexelius, The Swedish Institution of Justitieombudsman, 27 INT. Rrv. OF
ADmiN. Sc. 243, 248 (1961).
(Vol. 75: 1
THE SWEDISH JUSTITIEOMBUDSMAN
was published for the period 1911-1960. Infrequent indexing makes
continuing reference difficult even when copies are available.
This is not to suggest that the annual report remains unused. One
can see, in some offices, indices prepared personally by conscientious
readers; some copies are generously underlined and annotated; junior
officials speak frequently of their impatience to see reports which their
seniors are still studying. Since the Ombudsman's reports are not
sprightly, being written in a rather heavy official style and without
much appeal to the eye, the diligence with which many people read
them is remarkable.
In the end, nevertheless, the Ombudsman's opinions would be
scantily known were it not for their circulation in secondary sources.
The role of the press has already been discussed.7-2 The newspapers can
be depended upon to report the more flamboyant, easily understood
matters. Technical rulings and, even more significantly, the generaliza-
tions that should emerge from specific cases must be circulated by more
specialized publications. For example, a private organization reports
some of the Ombudsman's decisions affecting social insurance; other-
wise, they apparently remain unknown to administrators outside
Stockholm. The National Social Board sends to 800 communal child
welfare committees a circular letter which, among other things, in-
forms them about current Ombudsman opinions, but without perma-
nent form or indexing. A newspaper especially aimed at members of
local temperance committees performs a similar service in connection
with problems of alcoholism. A provincial agricultural administrator
has no awareness of the Ombudsman's observations unless they lead
the National Board of Agriculture to revise its standing instructions.
In that event, the new instruction might (but need not) mention the
reason for the change. A provincial prosecutor and police chief may
dispatch bulletins and recommendations to local offices within his
province, but he himself is scantily informed about current criticisms
and suggestions concerning the activities of other provinces. Matters
dealt with in the Ombudsman's inspection reports, but not afterward
included in his annual reports, may never be known elsewhere. Thus,
other provincial prosecutors were not apprised that one of their col-
leagues had been "given a reminder" to reactivate police training for
wartime duties, nor did other provinces receive the instruction given
to one of them concerning stays of execution pending the taking of
an appeal to the King in Council. A provincial governor declares him-
72. See pp. 31-34, supra.
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self too busy to read the Ombudsman's report except as lie sees bits
of it in the newspapers, but he is "confident that the senior civil
servants do read it and in time it trickles down to the rest." He there-
fore sees no need to circulate the document or particularly relevant
portions of it. A police officer of middle rank, in command of uni-
formed police in a large district, says that not much ever "trickles
down" to him in any form from any source, but he does recall a recent
circular letter from the provincial police chief: "I think that kind of
distribution usually stops with the higher ups," he said wistfully,
"though I enjoy reading about the Ombudsman in the papers now
and then." The head of a major police force says that pertinent portions
of the annual report are abstracted by a subordinate soon after it is
delivered; the portions selected for further distribution are circulated
among other members of his official family; if they call for instruc-
tions by him, he includes suitable paragraphs in the daily orders
that are addressed to all under his command; for the rest, knowledge
about the Ombudsman's activities depends upon a trade publication
("Swedish Police") and "just plain gossip, which is probably the best
circulator of them all." The National Prison Board, after careful
study by the legal division, sends out to all its units a circular letter
analyzing especially interesting decisions by the Ombudsman, but
the circular does not purport to be comprehensive. When decisions
necessitate a specific change in existing practices, the Board issues
its own orders accordingly, since (unlike some other administra-
tions) it has clear legal power to give binding directives to all
branches of the penal system.
This partial catalog suffices to show the chanciness that attends
distribution of the wisdom the Ombudsman has produced. A better
circulation system seems highly desirable, though the present some-
what haphazard methods have succeeded in producing surprisingly
great awareness of the Ombudsman's work. What to a foreigner's
eye appears somewhat chaotic may, indeed, merely be the normality
of administration in a country accustomed to wide dispersal of
authority.
ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS
The Ombudsman performs all his duties with the aid of half a
dozen law-trained assistants who work on a full-time basis, a few
"specialists" who may be engaged for short periods to concentrate
attention on a particular branch of administration, a handful of clerical
employees, and a Deputy Ombudsman who was originally conceived
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of as a temporary replacement when the Ombudsman was ill or on
leave, but who is now active throughout the year. The Deputy has
entire responsibility for the matters on which he acts.73 He is, in fact,
a second parliamentary Ombudsman who functions independently,
but so much in the Ombudsman's shadow that everyone in Sweden
prefers to believe he does not exist at all.
So small a group cannot supervise all officialdom. For the past several
years a special commission, appointed by the Minister of Justice upon
Parliament's request, has been considering how the workload may be
made manageable. Simple and obvious expedients-such as permitting
the Ombudsman to delegate his duty of inspection and to disregard
petty grievances, complaints made flavorless by the passage of time,
and attempted by-passings of internal administrative review-are likely
to be proposed. These steps to lessen the Ombudsman's burden seem
long overdue. More fundamental changes are made difficult by an
almost mystical belief shared by citizens and officials throughout
Sweden that the Ombudsman system's success depends upon assumption
of absolutely complete responsibility by one man alone, the Ombuds-
man himself. The "personal touch" by a great father figure is what
everyone wants to preserve.
In reality, as earlier portions of this paper have shown, Sweden al-
ready has more than one Ombudsman and seems to be no worse for
the multiplicity. The Military Ombudsman created in 1915, the Chan-
cellor of Justice, and the Deputy Ombudsman do Ombudsman's work
-as do, in a somewhat unheralded way, the public prosecutors through-
out the country.74 This reality is rarely looked squarely in the face in
Sweden. The ancient, more romantic conception of a knightly Om-
budsman riding forth to battle singlehandedly against every official
wrong continues to prevail.
Even more basic than the question of whether more than one Om-
budsman could be gainfully employed (as, for example, by assigning
supervision of judges to one, supervision of civil servants to another;
or supervision of tax authorities to one, supervision of social insurance
and welfare officials to another, supervision of other civil administra-
tors to a third) is the question of whether the Ombudsman system is
really the best means of administrative control. The answer to that
question must turn, of course, on the availability of other means.
Political institutions and traditions may induce an answer entirely
appropriate for Sweden that would be entirely invalid elsewhere.
73. Compare Lundvik, op. cit. supra note 14, at 48.
74. See pp. 38-40, supra.
1965]
58 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
For one who thinks in American terms, the Ombudsman system
seems a useful device for occasionally achieving interstitial reforms,
for somewhat countering the impersonality, the insensitivity, the auto-
maticity of bureaucratic methods, and for discouraging official arro-
gance. To rely on one man alone-or even on a few men-to dispense
administrative wisdom in all fields, to provide social perspectives, to
bind up personal wounds, and to guard the nation's civil liberties
seems, on the other hand, an old-fashioned way of coping with the
twentieth century.
